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Ensamkommande flyktingbarn

migrationsverket_2012

Jag har tidigare skrivit om ensamkommande flyktingbarn från Afghanistan. Jag har fått en hel del negativa kommentarer kring ämnet då jag utmärkande pekar ut en specifik etnisk grupp från Afghanistan. Av de efterforskningar jag har gjort har det visat sig att över 90% av de ensamkommande “flyktingbarn” från Afghanistan utgörs av den etniska gruppen Hazara. Hazarerna är av mongolisk härkomst vilket gör det svårt att avgöra hur gamla dessa är.

Det har tidigare skrivits spaltmeter om hur just denna minoritetsgrupp är förtryckta i Afghanistan men i dagens Afghanistan är det tvärtom. Den etnisk grupp som har fått det bäst ställt både ekonomiskt, utbildningsmässigt är just Hazarerna. Områden där just Hazarerna bor är helt konfliktfria och där existerar inte ens Talibaner. Jag anser att de ensamkommande flyktingbarn från Afghanistan som i själva verket inte är flyktingbarn utan är vuxna män  ljuger om sin ålder för att få stanna i Sverige.  Det är organiserad flyktingsmuggling med färdiga mallar av “cases” som redovisas för Migrationsverket som blint litar på alla utsagor från dessa män.

Det hade varit intressant om Migrationsverket kunde sammanställa bättre statistik på dessa män så att även etniciteten kunde registreras för att lättare styrka min tes om att mer än 90% av ensamkommande flyktingbarn från Afghanistan är Hazarer som genom just organiserad flyktingsmuggling tar sig till Sverige. Samlar man på sig denna typ av statisk kan man med sunt förnuft ställa sig frågan varför just Hazarer utgör en så dominerande andel av ensamkommande flyktingbarn från Afghanistan? Är förtrycket mindre allvarlig mot övriga folkgrupper i Afghanistan?

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In Afghanistan, women are determined to protect new-found freedoms. For the BBC’s 100 Women season, I met the women poets who face great risk, including death threats, to express their deepest thoughts.

In a little room tucked behind a Kabul cinema bedecked with Bollywood billboards, Afghan women are waging a literary war that is both personal and political.

They call poetry their sword.

“We take pure and sacred words and express our feelings with those words,” explains 29-year-old Pakisa Arzoo, with an energy as bright as her striking emerald green veil.

“But I know my society has this belief that writing poetry is a sin.”

A few dozen women writers meet every week to share poetry in a quiet place sealed off from the din of a bustling neighbourhood, and the pressures of a deeply conservative society.

Amil recites her poem with an emphatic cadence that captures everyone’s attention. It is a story they all know well.

“The fire of war has started and is burning the country / My heart is burning in these flames, my body is burning.”

The Mirman Baheer literary society brings women together to share and publish their poems, and find strength in greater numbers. It now counts a few hundred members in clubs in several Afghan cities.

“It’s our form of resistance,” explains one of the society’s founders, Sahira Sharif, a member of parliament.

Afghan women are drawing on their own traditions to break taboos. For centuries, in a largely illiterate society, women used verse as a means of expression and escape from lives largely controlled by men, except for their deepest thoughts.

Brave risks

Women poets have gone down in history. The warrior poet Malalai – who famously fought British troops in the 1880 Battle of Maiwand – and Rabia Balkhi – one of the first poets to write in modern Persian – are the stuff of legend.

Most members of the society in Kabul are educated women in professional jobs. But most still write under pen names. Some are chaperoned by male relatives who sit in neat rows of chairs on the other side of the room.

Others write in secret, their work hidden from their families. Determined and defiant, they take brave risks to belong to this special sorority, if only by telephone.

When a phone rings at the back of the room, Pakisa Arzoo rushes to take the call.

A schoolgirl is on the line with her poem from a village on the outskirts of Kabul.

Ms Arzoo carefully holds the mobile phone next to a crackling microphone so everyone can hear her tribute to her teacher.

“As I am serving today, I have become a doctor / Teacher, if I am an engineer today / It is all because of your hard work / That today I have become a soldier of this nation / I can feel all the pain and suffering you have been through…”

“When we recite our poems, we remove our pain,” says Seeta Habibi, Country Director for the Afghan Women’s Writing Project, a group established with the help of writers living in the United States.

“We talk to the paper with our pen and we fight for our rights on paper,” she explains. “Someday we hope we will win.”

Threats from the Taliban in the west of Afghanistan forced Ms Habibi, the only female journalist in her province, to leave her home.

Karima Shabrang faced a similar fate in her village in the remote northern province of Badakhshan. Local elders condemned her as a bad moral influence for her romantic laments of love and loss.

“They said I should be got rid of. They meant I should be killed,” she recalls in the simple mud brick home in the poor suburbs of Kabul where she now lives with two brothers who came to her rescue.

Unspoken subjects

She recites a poem with mementoes of Badakhshan around her: a striped rug of bright colours; a quail, issuing its staccato call from its cage.

But her explicit images of intimacy seem to belong to another place.

“I miss you… my hands are stretching from the ruins of Kabul… I want to invite you to my room for a delicious smoke… and you will give me refuge in your shivering red body.”

Is poetry worth a life in exile?

“I would prefer a dignified death to a life lived as a hostage in silence,” is Ms Shabrang’s softly voiced, strongly worded reply. Her work was recently honoured with an award by the Afghan chapter of PEN.

“It’s true these topics are not acceptable in today’s society but that doesn’t mean what I express is not true.”

‘Stronger than a letter’

Truth can be hard to tell in country struggling to emerge from 30 years of war.

The walls of the Kapisa Writers and Poets Society, two hours’ drive north of Kabul, are plastered with photographs of Afghan kings, presidents, and warlords.

That does not stop Dr Masouda from taking on the men with guns.

“Oh my God, all the warlords testing their weapons again and earning a lot of money out of war…” she recites from a handwritten poem.

But local commanders threatened her with dire consequences if she did not censor her published work. I ask her what they did not like about her poems.

“The truth, the truth,” she insists. “They want us to ignore crimes in Afghanistan, killings and bombings.”

But for all the poets’ pain, they believe they are making progress.

“Last year, five women won poetry prizes and their families realised poetry could be something positive,” says Dr Sharif, an MP.

“If a family member takes a step with them, even for just one hour or one day, it helps their struggle with wider society.”

At the poetry club in Kabul there is a poem to Afghanistan’s President, Hamid Karzai.

“I stand in your presence, president / Take my request. / I have come tired, restless and injured. / Your criminals made me cry.”

I later ask the president if he knew about the poem.

“Yes,” he replies with immediate recollection. “The poet read it to me when I visited her province.”

“A poem is always stronger than a letter,” says Dr Sharif.

As worries mount over their fragile gains of the past decade, women writers are now waging their own fight for their rights, including their right to write and be heard.

 

BBC

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 Copyright. April 6, 2013

By: Dr. Rahmat Rabi  Zirakyar, Independent Scholar, USA

zirakyar1234@yahoo.com

دا زموږ قسمت دی چې په ویـنو کې مزل وهـو       یو قـدرت چې ووهـو بیا بل وهـو بیا بل وهـو

Destiny demands we wade through pools of blood.

We have defeated the powerful repeat we must defeat, and yet once more.

 –A Pashto couplet

 

The above Pashto couplet points to the fate of the ancient Pashtun nation stretched between Oxus  in the north and Indus in the south and  reflecting historic trade and invasion routs. The battle between the former Silk-istan and current Pipeline-istan is now determining the Pashtun destiny.  Pashtuns are the superpower of egalitarian conscience and a culture of resistance. In such capacity they have been fighting against militarily superior (super)powers reflecting humankind inherent desire to be free.  Former U.S. President Ronald Reagan (1980-88) characterized the Afghan resistance against the fomer Soviet “Evil Empire”  as “man’s highest inspiration for freedom.” Also, he praised the former Mujahedin  as “the moral equal of our Founding Fahters .” But in the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy   the war in Afghanistan has been, to a great extent, put forth as  a war for human rights of the Afghan people, namely  to liberate them from the oppression  of Taliban and the majority Pashtuns. Some nine years prior to  the disaster of September 11, 2001, “CIA World Fact Book” (a type of “finished intelligence”) had reduced statistics of the majority Pashtuns in Afghanistan. We shall go to the roots of this  corrupt strategy. I am very thankful to Dr. Daud Miraki and Dr. Zaman Stanizai for their suggestions and constructive criticism of the rough draft of this writing.

 

Introduction

 

The independent nature of the Pashtun people had unavoidable consequences for the Pashtun Nation. Their spirit of self-determination has collided with the colonial powers of the past and with the imperial powers of today.

With approximately 60 million in Afghanistan and on the other side of the British- imposed Durand Line (1893), current Pakistan, it is a potent force that has made the global powers with local and regional agendas nervous. Consequently, throughout history, the enemies of Pashtuns have conspired to undermine them by suppressing them directly or used local minorities to do their bidding.  In the 20th century, when a charismatic King, Amanullah Khan (1919-29) led Afghanistan, British conspired and used a local bandit of minority Tajik background (Bacha Saqaw: the son of water carrier)  to undermine independent Pashtun rule and the promise of progress on the horizon effectively elevating Afghanistan from underdevelopment.

 

Sixty  years later in 1992, Afghanistan suffered from another Saqawi (by connotation, Saqawi is synonymous with chaos, anarchy): After the demise of the Soviet installed regime, Afghan minorities of the Northern Alliance embarked on a wicked campaign of fabrication and lies. The Massoud-Rabani regime destroyed the UN transitional plan and created an anarchy, a state of disorder and lawlessness that  was called “The SecondSaqawi” (Samsor Afghan). They inherited an anti-Pashtun initiative from the former Soviet Union that had a peace accord with Ahmad Shah Massoud (See Richardson).  Massoud might have attempted to undermine Pashtun demographics during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. Hence, when the government of Burhanudin Rabani and his protégé Commander Ahamd Shah Massoud came to power in 1992, a more scrupulous and malicious campaign was launched to fundamentally change the demographic landscape of the Pashtun people in official records.

 

This malicious and hateful campaign consisted of using the government apparatus to undermine Pashtun majority status by fabricating statistics and sharing them with international organizations including the CIA World Fact Book. This wicked yet strategic plan intended to cement the position of Afghan minorities in any future geopolitical dealing. Hence, in October of 2001, when the US invaded Afghanistan, the custodians of the post-1992 Tajik-led government, the Northern Alliance served the US’s interest and used those fabricated statistics that it secured during their reign (1992-1996) to make their case.

 

A Deliberate anti-Pashtun Campaign

 

Nineteenth century Muslim influential Scholar  and anti-colonialist  Sayed  Jamaluddin Afghan (1837-1897), in his book “Tatmatul Bayan Fi Tarikhul Afghan”, paid attention to Pashtuns as the  prevailing element of Afghan social structure (Prof. Sediqullah Reshtin, New Reseach (Peshawar/Pashtunkhwa, 1979, p. 98):

پوهاند صدیق الله رښتین، نوې څیـړنې(پیښور، پښتونخوا، ۱۹۷۹، مخ ۹۸ )/ د افغانستان  قــومي جوړښت د افغانستان لپاره د واک فونډیشن شپـږ کلنه(۱۹۹۶-۱۹۹۱)  سروې او څیـړنه،لمریز  ۱۳۷۷=   ۱۱مخ، ۱۹۹۸

The deliberate undertaking by the Massoud-Rabani regime (April 1992-September 1996) to downgrade majority Pashtun demographics was immediately reflected in CIA World Fact Book (July 1992).  What was the purpose of this tactic? This pursuit is deeply rooted in the nature of Soviet/Russian design, which backed minority ethnic politics to override national politics in Afghanistan.  A U.S.-educated and prolific socio-political analyst of Afghan descent Dr. Stanizai has succinctly explained the Soviet strategy in Afghanistan.

I will organize his approach in six steps.

 

STEP ONE: The Soviets/Russians focused  on the debasing of “the most resistant” of the ethnic groups; namely, the majority Pashtuns because they were usually the leading group in the Afghan armed forces, a majority among the Afghan resistance organizations, and “the cultural core of Afghanistan’s ‘national’ identity”.  To clarify his statement, Dr. Stanizai writes that the “uncompromising” resistance commander Zabihullah Mujahedwas “the only” non-Pashtun, whom the Soviets “wanted dead” and whose unyielding position “may have done him in”.

 

STEP TWO: The Soviets/Russians worked on curtailing the numerical strength of the Pashtun population: They stepped up  their military operations and aerial bombardments of the Pashtun areas in the south, while leaving the non-Pashtun areas in “relative calm” and  “virtually intact”. Indeed, at one point, the Soviets contemplated the idea of “moving the capital” from Kabul to Mazar-e Sharif in the north, the second largest Afghan city, “replacing Kandahar, which laid in ruins”.

 

STEP THREE:  In 1989 the Soviet forces retreated beyond the northern borders of Afghanistan, due to two realities on the ground:  They pulled back only “after making sure” that (a) the  resistant Pashtuns had been “weakened  sufficiently”, and they would not be pursued into Central Asia (as the then U.S. President George H. Bush pursued “a rapprochement with a kinder and gentler declining” Soviet Russia).

 

STEP FOUR:  The non-Pashtun minorities in the north were organized in the Northern Alliance (originally named: Supervisory Council of the Northern Regions= shora-e nezar-e safahat-e shamal). This was a unified minority front to fight against  “all aspects of the Pashtun life”.  Dr. Stanizai writes that “thus on the eve of the centennial” of the  colonial Durand Treaty that had divided Afghanistan in 1893, “a deep chasm was created in the ethno-linguistic mosaic”  of Afghanistan.

 

STEP FIVE:  Supported by the Soviets  during the resistance and their staunch former Afghan Communist leader Babrak Karmal’s  generals, the Northern Alliance leader  Massoud claimed victory in Kabul in Apil of 1992  and replaced Karmal’s successor Dr. Najibullah, an ethnic Pashtun.  Massoud  attributed his triumph to the Northern Alliance, to which Karmal ethnically belonged. This gesture was symbolic in the ethnic political arena organized around “Tajik supremacy” while undermining, targeting and depriving the Pashtun majority. The Northern Alliance under the leadership of Massoud was implementing “the ‘anybody-but-Pashtun’ agenda”.Massoud forced President Sebghatullah Mujadidi, a figurehead, out of office after two months and replaced him with Borhanoddin Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik.

 

STEP SIX:

With the onset of the Tajik-centered government installed and run by the Massoud-Rabbani team, a deliberate anti-Pashtun campaign began with the explicit goal of defrauding Pashtuns of their identity,using the State apparatus and institutions. Using bureaucratic fraud and coercion, large segment of Pashtuns inside Afghanistan and returning refugees from Pashtunkhwa (former NWFP: 1901-2010) were given new national identity cards that identified them as Tajiks. This was part of a calculated campaign to undermine the majority status of Pashtuns and fraudulently increased the percentage of Tajiks.Other ethnic minorities targeted Pashtuns violently by terrorizing them. For example, Hazara forces targeted Pashtun homes and violated Pashtun families until they were forcefully evicted from their homes, particularly in the 3rd and 4th districts of Kabul. Similarly, Uzbek militia looted homes in the predominantly Pashtun districts of the city until Pashtuns abandoned their homes and became refugees inside and outside the country. At the “national” level, “the ethnic cleansing campaigns began in the north”, where entire Pashtun villages were depopulated through campaigns of terror.  Also, for further information on Massoud’s links to Soviets/Russians ,see U.S. thorough and trustworthy expert on Afghanistan, author, and journalist Richardson, who traveled to Afghanistan in 1986, 1987, 1990,1991and 1997.

 

Consequently, the Tajik led government of Massoud-Rabbani  concocted new census aimed at distorting the ground realities of Afghan society by reducing Pashtuns from nearly 60% to 38% and increaseing the proportion of Tajiks from 12% to 25%.  The Kabul regime disseminated these figures to international organizations as official data ( Stanizai received  this information from the late Afghan academician Abdul ShakurRashad (1921-2004), whose private home-based library was looted by Northern Alliance warlords). Soon these fabricated population figures  were reflected in the CIA World Fact Book (July 1992) and most probably from this source to the National Geographic World Atlas and the World Almanac, among other publications. The CIA even sent CDs of the above data to Russian libraries (an Afghan living in Russia reported about this information in printed Afghan media in Western Europe. Zirakyar). For more information about the above six steps, consult Stanizai, “From Identity Crisis to Identity in Crisis in Afghanistan”. Electronic version: December 16, 2009. http://www.stanizai.org/     [November 15, 2012].  Stanizai is a sharp political analyst in Afghan and Islamic affairs.

 

Today( April 25, 2013), I received an important write up by Richardson, who is not in reality a “Pashtun Ghost Writer”, but a resourceful and honest American journalist, author and expert on the issues of Afghanistan.The anti-Pashtun plot discussed in Talooqan conference of 2003 might have been running parallel to the  CIA’s statistics that reduced majority Pashtuns to the largest minority in Afghanistan (Talooqan is the capital of theTakhar province in northern Afghanistan).This plan reminds us of the former Soviet leader Brezhnev’s scheme to divide Afghanistan in 1981. The Talooqan plan was forged by American private imperialism and Russia, the successor of former social imperialism.  The late Burhanuddin Rabani, the former Tajik president of the civil war period (1992-96), participated in the Talooqan conference. “The anti-Pashtun orientation of the Bush Administration financed and fueled the conference, which was reported to have cost $75 million dollars.” At the Talooqan conference of 2003  “were present all factions of the Northern Alliance accompanied by an ever-present throng of Communist generals,” but the majority Pashtuns “were denied representation” in the above conference. (Richardson, April 25, 2013).

 

Afghan Ethnic and Linguistic  Statistics Collected from the CIA World Fact Book  (1981-2012 = 1360-1391 Solar Hijri)

 

According to CIA, its own “CIA World Fact Book” is one of the three types of “finished

intelligence”, which means “the final product of intelligence cycle”, which in turn  is the process by which information is (a) received, (b) refined( “analyzed and interpreted”) into intelligence and (c) presented to policymakers.  The other two types of  finished intelligence are “The President’s Daily Brief” and the “National Intelligence Estimates”.  Former intelligence officer Robert L. Suettinger relates that  National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) “necessarily  have to devolve into a realm of speculation”. The October 2002  prewar intelligence  about  Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction soon became nothing more than the “mashroom cloud” of lies. After this war, however, U.S. and British leaders justified their action by focusing on the character of Saddam Hussein rather than on the evidence for his capabilities. British leader Churchill mentioned to Soviet leader Stalin at the Teheran Conference in 1943: “In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.”

Social and Political Science Professor and President of American Political Science Association (2001) Robert Jervis wrote: “All too often…intelligence estimates tell us more about interests and foreign policy preferences of powerful groups in government than it does about what the other side’s intentions and capabilities are.”

 

In context of “the clash of civilizations”, the CIA’s statistics for Afghan ethnic and linguistic groups can be interpreted.

 

The following table presents the estimated statistics of Afghan ethnic and linguistic groups from 1981 to 2012.  From 1992, the percentage of Pashtuns and their language was significantly lowered in the CIA World Fact Book. The year 1992, when the CIA lowered the Pashtuns’ statistics, their attempt coincided with the onset of pro-Tajik regime of Massuod and Rabani in Afghanistan, which destroyed the UN transitional plan.

 

Afghan Demographics in CIA World Fact Book 1981-2012

YearEthnic Group PercentageTotal PopulationLanguage  Percentage
EstimatesEstimatesEstimatesEstimates
کالقومي سلنېژبـنئ سلنېټول وګړي
1981(1360)Pashtuns      50%Pashto                    50%            15,193,000
Tajiks          25%Farsi(Persian)       35%
Hazaras        9%Uzbeki,Turkmeni  11%
Uzbeks         9%all other languages  4%
All others      7%
1990(1369)Pashtuns      50%Pashto                   50%15,862,293
Tajiks           25%Farsi                     35%
Hazaras   12%-15%Uzbeki,Turkmeni  11%
Uzbeks          9%all other languages  4%
All others  3%-4%
1991(1370)Same as aboveSame as above16,450,304
1992(1371)Pashtuns       38%Pashto                    35%16,095,664
Tajiks            25%Farsi                      50%
Hazaras        19%Uzbaki,Turkmeni  11%
Uzbeks           6%all other languages  4%
All others     12%
2001(1381)Pashtuns        38%Pashto                     35%26,813,057
Tajiks             25%Farsi                        50%
Hazaras         19%Uzbaki,Turkmeni    11%
Uzbaks           6%all other languages    4%
All others        8%
2006-2012Pashtuns         42%Pashto                       35%(31,056,997)
(1385-1391)Tajiks             27%Farsi(Persian)           50%31,889,923
Hazaras           9%Uzbeki & Turkmeni 11%32,738,376
Uzbeks            9%all other languages     4%33,609,937
All others       13%

………………………….   29,835,392

July 2012 estimates….       30,419,928

Data collected and organized from the “CIA World Fact book” by Rahmat  Zirakyar

 

Now, the question is justifiable whether the reduction of Pashtun statistics  in  the “CIA World Fact Book”(1992-2012 ) is self-serving, a mask for U.S support for minority rule in Afghanistan following the 911 catastrophe?

 

Shedding Light on CIA World Fact Book Statistics for Afghanistan

 

It is important to mention that ethnic divisiveness was first used by Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia in the 18th and 19th century as a vehicle for dividing and conquering. During their occupation of Afghanistan (December 1979-Febraury 1989), the Soviets tried to lower statistical significance of the majority Pashtuns in their country. The purpose of this politics was to prepare Afghanistan for partition. To achieve this goal, the Soviet military operations tremendously debased and dehumanized Pashtuns while recruiting non-Pashtun Massoud, Dostam and others to facilitate the transition of northern tier of Afghanistan into the Soviet system. There were two probable ways for the realization of this design: Via partition of Afghanistan or its eventual annexation to Central Asian Soviet republics, where Afghan Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen have ethnic kinsmen.

The name of Afghan communist Babrak Karmal (1929-1996) is synonymous with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989). In his era (1979-1986), a campaign for population census was launched to manipulate Pashtun population statistics. To effortlessly manipulate the demographic realities, most of the time this question was asked:  “In which language are you fluent?” ( ba kodam lesan mosalat asted?).

به کدام لسا ن مسلط استید

(Private information shared with me by a member of the Central Committee of the then ruling People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Zirakyar).

Since many Pashtuns are able to speak Pashto as well as Dari, their answers reflecting confidence in both languages were manipulated to mask the true size of the Pashtun people and falsely elevate Tajik percentage in the country. This way, the pro-Soviet Karmal’s census crew camouflaged the ethnic identity o Pashtuns. Generals of the Karmal faction sided with Ahmad Shah Massoud and helped him to consolidate power in Kabul in April of 1992 whereby effectively neutralizing the U.N. transition plan.  Consequently, this maneuvering coalition along ethnic and linguistic lines led to the “Second Saqawi”:  anarchy and the civil war (1992-1996).

 

It is important to know that the academic landscape of international relations and global politics faced certain fundamental morphological transformation. After all, the Soviet Union was on its deathbed and a new reformulation had to emerge to both make sense of the emerging changes and serve as forecasts for future policy formulations. Hence, soon after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in February of 1989, “The Roots of Muslim Rage”  (1990) by Professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern History Bernard Lewis and “The Clash of Civilizations?” (1993- expanded to a book in 1996) by renowned Political Scientist Professor Huntington) emerged.  Generally, the West discovered Islam (officially radical Islam) as the “New Communism”. In context of such political mentality, CIA World Fact Book statistics for Afghan ethnic and linguistic groups can be interpreted.

 

The CIA World Fact Book is published each year in the month of July. As we know, the anti-Pashtun Northern Alliance came to power in Kabul in  the month of April 1992. In less than three  months after this event, the CIA World Fact Book was published in the month of July, in which the statistics of majority ethnic Pashtuns were considerably  reduced from 50 percent to 38 percent and those of their language from 50 percentage to 35 percent. I want to explain this  issue:  For the first time in 1992, The CIA World Fact Book considerably lowered the statistical significance of Pashtuns. (Zirakyar, 2009;  and Richardson, 2009, p.275).

What is the purpose of inflating the population size of non-Pashtun minorities while downgrading the majority Pashtun demographics? The lasting and enduring relations between CIA and Northern Alliance suggest that both of them needed each other’s cooperation in reducing Pashtun ethnic and linguistic statistics. This deliberate and self-serving undertaking by the CIA to lower Pashtun socio-linguistic data is indicative of a public relations ploy for a world-wide support for an unjust war, which was packaged  as a just war: to free the majority (minority non-Pashtuns) from the so-called oppression of the minority (majority Pashtuns). This statistical-psychological operation helped Washington to disenfranchise and alienate the majority Pashtuns. Hence, the CIA World Fact Book reduced the size of Pashtun population in Afghanistan from majority Pashtuns to the largest ethnic group in their country.

Two reliable Afghan scholars whose names need not be disclosed told me (Zirakyar) that three men were “involved” (dakheel) in the process of reducing Pashtun statistics: Two (R.F. and E.E) are non-Pashtun Afghans holding PhD’s in linguistics, and the third one (T.F.) is a U.S. expert on Afghanistan with good ties to “Zal” (Zalmay Kh.). From the two non-Pashtun Afghan linguists one is a translator and teacher in a U.S. military establishment, and the other was a high-ranking politician in previous Afghan governments. Both of them had maintained very good relations with Massoud-Rabbani regime in Kabul (April 1992-September 1996). Once again, this information substantiates my assertion that the CIA and the Massoud-Rabbani regime needed each other’s cooperation to decrease the majority Pashtun demographics. Massoud and his acolytes hated Pashtuns, particularly their language Pashto because it has the substance for the national identity of Afghanistan as a state and as a country. A Pashto proverb says: “Don’t kill the beggar, just take away his begging bowl.”

ملنګ مه وژنه، کچکـول ورنه واخـله

Colonialism not only controls colonized people through administrators of the dominant colonial culture but indirectly by using subservient members of the colonized culture. Colonialism and imperialism are  considerably similar and each energizes the other: Their motive is to exploit the colonized or controlled nations. Massoud served as dues ex machina in the Soviet, Iranian  and American  political agenda in Afghanistan.

A U.S.-born Eric Margolis  is a veteran journalist, writer and “Eisenhower Republican,” who  writes mainly about the Middle East, South Asia and Islam. He came to the conclusion in 2009 that America cannot establish peace and stability in Afghanistan unless the majority Pashtuns (“55%”) are “enfranchised”, namely “dealing directly with Taliban”,  who are “part of the Pashtun people”.

The following tabulation presents the ethnic and linguistic statistics presented by the late Afghan Academician Abdul Shakur Rashad as a reaction to the false demographics published in the CIA “Word Fact Book” only three months after the onset of pro-Tajik regime, in July 1992.

 

Title

Author

Date and Place of Publication

Percentage of Major Ethnic Groups

Pashtun

Tajik

Hazara

Uzbek

Afghanistan

Prof. M. Ali

1955 Kabul

60

20

Afghanistan

Max Clumborg

1960

60

30

3

3

The National Languages of
Afghanistan

Prof. Aslanov

1964 USSR

60

The World of Geoethnology

M. Mahjub Yawari

1987 (5th Ed.) Iran

60

20

5

5

World’s Largest Languages

McKenzie

1987 Europe

55-65

History and Establishment of
Afghanistan

Abdul Azim Walyan

1987 Iran

70

13

Fundamentalism Reborn?
Afghanistan and the Taliban

William Maley

1998 London

62.73

12.4

9

6

Afghanistan Federal System

M. Enam Wak

2000 Pakistan

62

12

9

6

The World Almanac

Primedia

2000 USA

38

25

19

6

 

Copyright www.hewad.com

 

Complementary Note

 

In the second row of the  above table, the last name of German-speaking Austrian expert on Afghanistan is misspelled (Clumborg). Its correct spelling is Klimburg. Max Klimburg holds graduate degrees in Art History and Ethnology. His book was  published in 1966 with this  complete  title “Afghanistan: Das Land im historischen Spannungsfeld Mittelasiens”.  I am very sure that this is the book quoted in the above table. Now, I will turn to other western sources dealing with Afghan demographics.

 

Estimates of Afghan Ethnic Statistics Presented in Other Western Sources

 

Gul Janan Sarif indicated in his dissertation thesis (1972) that from 11-12 million Afghans circa nine million have Pashto as mother language.  H.F. Schurmann  estimated  ( 1962) that Pashtuns make up at least half of the Afghan population. Similarly, D.N. Wilber (1962) figured that Pashtuns make up 50%-60% of the Afghan population. According to  Area Handbook for Afghanistan (4th edition, 1973),  from 16 million Afghans “over 8” millions are Pashtuns.  According to. Magnus and Naby (1998), the Pashtuns “form the most important and probably the most numerous ethnic group in Afghanistan….the standard estimate is that 40 to 50 percent of the [Afghan] population is” Pashtuns (p.12).  Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. III (1992) estimates that Pashtuns “constituted from 50 to 60 percent of the population of prewar Afghanistan . Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996 ) wrote that Pashtuns “comprise the largest group, 54% of the total population.” The official languages  of Afghanistan are Pashto and Dari “or Persian” that are “spoken by 52% and 30% of the population respectively.”  Fareed Zakaria, the host of CNN’s important foreign affairs show (GPS), was discussing with Peter Galbraith (former U.N. Representative to Afghanistan). Here Zakaria  spoke of “majority Pashtuns, 50%”. April 11, 2010). Arnold was a U.S. intelligence officer assigned to Afghanistan, Germany, Sweden, Burma, Japan, and England. He retired in 1979. In his book (1983, P. 2), Arnold wrote that  Pashto is “the native tongue of about 55 percent of the population. Nevertheless, Arnold is pointing out  to a prevailing and strange linguistic reality in Afghanistan: “Oddly, although Pashtuns comprise over half the population, their language is not the dominant one.”

 

Nyrop and Seekins (2001/ Electronic Version) stated  that  most population statistics in Afghanistan are  founded on estimates. The first and  “most scientific demographic survey” was  implemented  in Afghanistan in 1972-1974 by the State University of New York for the United States Agency for International Development (AID), in cooperation with the then Afghan government.  This survey declared a settled population of 10.8 million. However, it did not report the nomadic population, which was “separately estimated at slightly more than 1 million” (p.99).  On the same page we can read that the Afghan population estimate  in 1995 amounted to 18.4 million.  A few pages later we can easily decipher another  population estimate in 1996: “approximately” 40% of Afghans were Pashtuns, successively followed by  25.3% Tjiks,18% Hazaras, 6.3% Uzbeks, 2.5% Turkmen, while other ethnic groups totaled to 7.9% including 1% Qizilbash (p. 104). Now, take a look at another population size of Pashtuns in 1995 on the same page: “The largest and traditionally most politically powerful ethnic group” of Pashtuns  reached in 1995 “an estimated 10.1 million…”(p.104). If we divide this estimated number by the estimated total population number, the result for Pashtun population size shall be nearly 55%, unless it is an error committed by  the authors/editors (Nyrop and Seekins)? 10,100,000/18,400,000=0.5489=55% Pashtuns.

Even U.S. Central Command General Tommy Franks (June 2000-July 2003) who led the invasion of Afghanistan  in 2001 and  the invasion of Iraq in 2003, spoke of “majority Pashtuns” (see below).

 

Let’s take a look at a few French sources. According to  Encylopedia de L’Agora (2013):  Pashtuns  make up  38% and their language Pashto35% , Tajiks  are (25%),  and “perse afghan” (Dari ) 50%, Hazarasare19%, Turkmens are 11%. As reported by Le petit Larousse (2011): Pashtuns  are 40% and Tajiks are 30%.  As stated in Larousse Encyclopedique (2007): Pashtuns  amount to 40%. Pursuant to ONG show (Tomorrow’s Afghanistan) created in 2001: Pashtuns  constitute 40%), Tajiks 32%, Hazaras 9%. In keeping with Atlas Economique Mondial (2000), Pashtuns consist of 38%, Tajiks 25%, and Hazaras 14% of the Afghan population. I am very thankful to Dr. Osman Rostar Taraki for sharing the above French data with me (March 13, 2013).

 

The French statistics for Afghan ethnic composition need to be scrutinized. They illustrate the French government’s strong inclination toward an anti-Pashtun group and its so-called “legendary” commander Massoud. Wecan  easily identify resemblance between the above French and CIA’s statistics about  the Afghan ethnic and linguistic structure. The reason is that former colonial France and current imperial U.S.A. have a common denominator for the realization of  their national interests: the  political puppet Ahmad Shah Massoud. He had the courage  to auction the independence, sovereignty and territorial  integrity of Afghanistan to colonial and imperial powers (Soviet Union, Russia, France, and U.S.A.) and Persian-speaking Iran without any discrimination.

 

I assume that after 1992  British and German sources might have followed the CIA’s template for the  Afghan socio-linguistic composition.

To refute the cooked up statistics, I need to present the Wak Foundation for Afghanistan’s comprehensive study and data. Until now, this research and survey project has produced the most authoritative and authentic document on the ethnic composition of Afghanistan.

 

         Wak Foundation’s Statistics for Afghan  Ethnic and Linguistic Groups

For the record,“The Ethnic Composition of Afghanistan” is a six-year survey and research project ( April 1991- July 1996). It was conducted by the then Peshawar/Pashtunkhwa-based Wak–Foundation for Afghanistan which was published in 1998 (1377 Solar Hijri). This self-funding organization is Research and Implementation Institute for Afghanistan’s  Rehabilitation, Development and Drug Control Programmes.   Engineer Mohammad Enam Wak is the Founder and President of the Wak Foundation for Afghanistan (I will be using here its short form: Wak Foundation). He is of Tarin-Pashtun heritage born in 1954 in  Sorkhrod ofNangarhar province and graduated from the Geology Department at the Kabul University in Afghanistan. Enam Wak is the author of several publications in his mother language Pashto. While working in Iran, his two books were published there in Farsi (Persian). To refute the cooked up statistics, I need to present the Wak Foundation for comprehensive study and data for Afghanistan.

 

Until now, this research and survey project has produced the most authoritative and authentic document on the ethnic composition of Afghanistan.  In 2012  The Aryana Encyclopedia (da aryana daieratul ma’aref) in Kabul printed  (p. 455) ethnic statistics that are matching with those published by the Wak Foundation  in (1998= 1377 Solar A.H.): Pashtun (62.73%), Tajik(12.38%), Hazaras (9%), Uzbeks (6.10%), Turkmen (2.69%), etc. Mrs. Soraya Popal, who is currently the President of the Academy of Sciences in Kabul, had declared the above statistics in the House of Representative of Afghanistan (wolasi jarga). Below is the Pashto text published in the Aryana Encyclopedia:

«دافغانستان ملی اتنیکی جوړښت چې په دې وروستیو کې څرګند شوی او په لاندې ډول وړاندی کیـږي: پښتانه ۶۲،۷۳، تاجک ۱۲،۳۸، هزاره  ۹،۰۰، ازبک ۶،۱۰، ترکمن ۲،۶۹، ایماق ۲،۶۸….»- مخ ۴۵۵، اریانا دایـرة المعارف

 

Wak Foundation’s Methodology Credibility

The survey of Wak Foundation has credibility for the detailed and meticulous efforts; familiarity with the cultural nuances and socio-ethnic organization of the Afghan society; and the time spent achieving results.

Consultations with Afghan scholars, intellectuals, dignitaries,  former civil servants, teachers, and religious and tribal leaders took place. These discussions broadened the survey staff members’ horizon to respect the socio-cultural norms of local communities, as the circumstances may require. Also, they were trained by experts.  Besides, preliminary   survey was conducted in early 1991 among refugee population residing inIran( Tehran and Mashad), Peshawar, and Quetta. Similar exploratory interviews were run with knowledgeable people in large cities of Afghanistan in early 1991. This survey started with zone and extended down to the village.  The actual survey in Afghanistan was mainly conducted on the district (wolaswali) level while in some locations on the village level (May 1991-September1996). During the actual survey, some of its field members went to Russia and Central Asian countries in 1995 . Their mission was to verify with Afghans there the data of the preliminary survey conducted in Afghanistan’s northern  provinces. “Some of the interviews” conducted in central Asian countries “obliged” the Wak Foundation to “repeat the survey in some”  of the northern provinces of Afghanistan like Baghlan, Samagan and Balkh.  “A few districts in these provinces” were reexamined in early 1996.  Nancy Hatch Dupree, the wife of the late  U.S. distinguished expert on Afghanistan Professor Louis Dupree, wrote in her endorsement of the Wak Foundation project about the Afghan ethnic composition:  “  Rarely have Afghans taken an interest in this bewildering subject”.  Therefore, she complimented Wak for “ being a pioneer in this essential endeavour” (11 June 1998, University Town, Peshawar). A short version of this 255-page book in Pashto was published in English  in July of 1999 in Peshawar, and its final draft was “edited” by Nancy H. Dupree.

Attempt to Kill Mohammad Enam Wak, June 1, 2000

The effectiveness of the Wak Foundation became a threat to the conspirators of both the Massoud-Rabani regime in Kabul and the Punjabi-run government of Pakistan. To destroy this important institution at its core, they might have hand in the attempt to assassinate the founder and president of the Wak Foundation.

 

Following the Pashto version of The Ethnic Composition of Afghanistan (1998), its compact English version was published in July of 1999. A third book published by Wak was Federalism in Afghanistan (2000), in which he discussed the unification of Pashtuns on both sides of the illegal, invalid  and immoral Durand Line of 1893. Peshawar-based  Afghan sources believed that these three book had  unsettled the Pakistani intelligence and Massoud. The  leader of the Northern Alliance Massoud could not tolerate (a) the Pashtun identity of Afghanistan, (b) the Pashtun ethnic statistics in Afghanistan (62.73%) and (c)  the need for Pashtun unification. The Pakistani intelligence service  was agitated by the argument of Pashtun unification. In light of such  positions, one can argue that the decision to assassinate Enam Wak was triggered by the above three books. Leaving his home for work, Eanm Wak was repeatedly shot in the front of the exit door of his residence in Peshawar by unidentified gunmen on June 1, 2000:  twice in the left arm and once in the abdomen (Waksaw two men at the two front corners of his residence). After

being released from the hospital, he took refuge in Norway.

The probability of Massoud involvement in the attempted assassination of Wak is more likely than the Pakistani Intelligence service since Massoud had to gain a lot more from his death than the Pakistani Intelligence. Moreover, Pakistani Intelligence has professional assassins and they make sure the targeted person does not survive. The fact that Wak survived points to the culprits wanting to dissipate expeditiously in order to avoid capture by local  police. Had it been the Pakistani Intelligence, they would have made sure to finish him before departing the scene of the crime since they had no reason to worry about capture.

 

Wak Foundation Criticizing Previous Population Statistics

Due to the fact that the Afghan society is heterogeneous, Wak Foundation  has

criticized  the collection of previous  population statistics  for  these  reasons:

First, the previous  population statistics did not distinguish between  ethnic and language groups in Afghanistan:  For example,  Persian (Farsi, Dari)-speaking  ethnic Pashtuns in Herat were counted as Tajiks.  Farsi-speaking  Hazaras are  ethnically Hazaras, not Tajiks. Although  members of  the Afghan  royal family were  using the Afghan version of Persian (Dari), they were not called Tajiks, but Mohammadzai Pashtuns. The Pashtun society is predominantly tribal, in which the identity is secured mainly by ethnicity (qaum).  If we compare the Afghan society to an orange, then language is the skin of the orange, not the independent parts (tribes) within its skin.

Determining the ethnic percentage in Afghanistan by mixing language identity with ethnic identity caused problems for determining ethnic identity. This means that Tajik is not an ethnic identity, but a default linguistic identity.  Consequently,  Pashtuns, who could  or did not speak Pashto, were counted as Tajiks.  Farsi/Dari speaking Pashtuns lost their cultural/language  identity by 7.73%  to Tajiks: Pashtuns are ethnically 62.73% of the total Afghan population. However, linguistically/culturally  they are 55%. Nevertheless, Pashtuns made up ethnically as well as culturally the majority of  the total Afghan population (17,918,454) in 1996, the year of the completion of  the Wak Foundation’s survey.

Second, smaller ethno-religious minorities like Ismailite Tajiks and Shiite Qizelbash are counted with Hazaras. This, in turn, increased the number of Hazara group. U.S. anthropologist and expert on Afghanistan Louis Durpree (1929-1989) deemed Taimanis  as part of Aimaqs; however, they are originally Pashtuns, not Aimaqs.  Most of the Farsibans (Farsi-speaking people) in Herat are Pashtuns while some of them are Aimaqs.

Third, mixing language with ethnicity is not appropriate for counting the population of Afghanistan. Precisely, Afghan Persian (Dari) is the mother tongue of Tajiks; however, it does not mean that all Persian-speaking Afghans are  of Tajik heritage. The question in this state of affairs is this: Why non-Tajik Afghans prefer to speak Persian (Dari)? The main reason for this situation is that Dari/Farsi was the language of the court, bureaucracy, business, the press, as well as mostly the language of education.

Fourth, Pashto language was suffering from social prestige because the ethnically Pashtun royal  and ruling family did not try to learn, read  speak and write in Pashto. Hence, Pashto became a neglected, second class national language. If the King and his family members do not communicate in Pashto, why should the prime minister, ministers of departments, university professors, parliamentarians, generals, diplomats, governors, media, business… and the general public use Pashto as the medium of communication. Practically, Pashto speakers could not aspire to position of power in Afghanistan without learning, writing and speaking Dari/Farsi (Persian). In fact, Pashto was precluded   from social prestige and blocked from the sphere of political economy. Pashto urgently needed and needs a top-down solution to achieve social prestige. This will enable Pashto to become a productive partner in the framework of political economy. Pashtun poet-philosopher Gul-Pacha Ulfat (1909-1977) had expressed his thought in a couplet on the diminishing social status of Pashto:

People communicate in the language used in the government

When will Pashto become the language of the government

سر او کار د خلکو دی د ژبې د سر کار سره                      کله به غـریــبه پـښتو ژبه د سـرکارشــي

Fifth, Dari was the main language of education and press. Most schools and all institutions of higher education were taught in Dari. Also, Dari was part of the religious curriculum in mosques and madrasas: The 13th century Persian writer and poet Saadi Shirazi’s  two books (Bostan=the  Orchard, and Golistan= the Rose) were organized about his Sufi, social and moral thoughts, and for this reason they have been taught in mosques. Today’s Iran (since 1935), former “Persia” and its language “Farsi” (Persian) have always been internationally known as “Persian”, not Irani.  As a powerful neighbor, Iran has had a deep cultural influence in Afghanistan. To adjust them to the Iranian cultural ideals, the western cultural exports were “mostly filtered, refined and conditioned.”  Practically, Dari was compulsory for all government employees in Afghanistan.  Pashtuns and other non-Tajik ethnic groups that were going to Kabul to study and/or to do business had no other choice but to speak Farsi-Dari. The prominent newspaper “Anis” was published in Dari. There was no girl school for Pashto-speaking population in Kabul. There were only two high schools in Kabul where the teaching language was Pashto: Khoshal Baba Lycee and Rahman Baba Lycee.  “Royal court without Pashto means the death of Pashtuns” (be Pashto arg da Pashtano marg dai, Zirakyar). For an analysis of the importance of language, see Zirakyar (December 2010).

Languages not only serve as the means of communication, but also they are the medium of influence, power and identity-especially in a politically organized community (nation state). As long as there are nation states, there will be national interests and national languages. Languages are fundamental to cultural and national identity. The future of humanity depends on both the cultural identity and the cultural diversity. SeeZirakyar (Language from Adam to Present, December 2010= Linda 1389 Solar A.H.).

Percentage of Afghan Ethnic Groups Based on Ethnicity and Language

From WAK Foundation Research and Survey (1991-1996)

په افغانستان کې  د خـټـې او ژبې په بنسټ د بـیلابـیلو قومونو ســلـنـې، واک فـوڼـډ یشـن:

۱۹۹۶-۱۹۹۱

 

 

NumberMajor Ethnic Groups            Based on Ethnicity        Based on Language
  %%
1Pashtuns62.7355
2Tajiks12.3833
3Hazaras9.0000
4Uzbeks6.105.80
5Turkmen2.691.4
6Aimaqs2.6800

 

For collecting demographic data in Afghanistan, seven regions were determined by the

Wak Foundation as follows: 1.         Northern Region: Samangan, Balkh, Jozjan and  Fariab province.

2.         North-Eastern Region: Badakhshan, Takhar, Konduz and Baghlan Province.

3.         North-Western Region: Ghor, Badghis, Herat and Farag Provice.

4.         Eastern Region: Paktia, Nangarhar, Kunar and Laghman Province.

5.         East-Central Region: Ghazni, Logar, Wardag, Kabul, Kapisa, Parwan and Bayan.

6.         Southern Region: Nimroz, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabal, Paktika,  and  Orzgan.

7.         Nomads

 

Ethnicity-Based Percentage of Major Ethnic Groups in Seven Afghan Regions

Total

Total Other

Grand

Total

RegionsPashtunsTajiksHazarasUzbeksAimaqsTurkmen

Considerable  Minorities

Small Minorities

Northern684,532148,191253,756765,7081,305378,7972,232,28961,3452,293,634
30%6%11%33%0%17%97%3%
North-Eastern711,194981,80789,605283,91635,1492,101,67171,2852,172,956
33%45%4%13%2%97%3%
North-Western1,115,037154,91227,1666,071478,82549,0461,831,05753,0531,884,110
59%8%1%0%25%3%97%3%
Eastern1,994,27518,23787902,013,391200,4622,213,853
90%1%0091%9%
East-Central2,907,405912,4541,000,49537,38818,6944,876,436119,5354,995,971
58%18%20%1%0%98%2%
Southern2,047,6792,812239,9594472,290,89767,0332,357,930
87%0%10%0%97%3%
Nomads1,780,0001,780,000220,0002,000,000
89%0%0%0%89%11%
Total11,240,122          2,218,413            1,611,860     1,093,530      480,130481,68617,125,741792,71317,918,454
  
 62.73%             12.38%                   9%6.10%2.68%                 2.69%                      95.58%                   4.42% 

 

Now,  I shall shed some  light on the characteristics of the leaders of the  Northern Alliance:

 Who  Are  the  Major Players in the Northern Alliance?

It is important to also point out and establish the credibility of the leaders of the Northern Alliance as their malicious exercise in indecency in regards to  Pashtuns’  demographic  manipulation is indicative of their character. The following write-up and quotes are of the U.S. officials assessing the main figures of the Northern Alliance.

 

Two days after the 9/11 tragedy (during the National Security Council meeting on September 13, 2001), President George W. Bush wanted to know  from the CIA leadership  about the individual Northern Alliance leaders? Cofer Black (Director of Counterterrorism Center at CIA) said: “One key [Northern] Alliance general, Abdurrashid Dostum, had been on everyone’s payroll-Russia, Iran and Pakistan.” (Quoted in Bob Woodward, 2002, p. 53). Woodward knew from DIA’s “ highly classified memo”, which “in large part blamed General Fahim, essentially calling him a wimp who would talk and talk, then not show up for battle.” (Ibid. 268). CIA’s Director Tenet said at the National Security Council’s above meeting that “with the CIA teams and tons of money, the [Northern] Alliance could be brought together into a cohesive fighting force.” (Ibid., p. 51).

 

According to Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Central Command Lt. General Michael DeLong, Northern Alliance’s major commanders (Dostam, Khalili, Faheem, and Ismael Khan) were “fighting and  killingwithout remorse” and this “was a way of life for them”. General DeLong adds that “each having personally killed to fifty men”, and  after the 911 catastrophe they would be “theoretically” the generals  fighting in Afghanistan for the Commander-in-Chief  of the U.S. Central Command General Tommy Franks. (DeLong with Noah  Lukeman 2004, pp. 24-47).  Also, General Tommy Franks  was aware of the fact that “northern factions fighting against majority Pashtuns” would create another civil war in Afghanistan. (Franks quoted in Berntsen,2005, pp 289-92). Berntsen, who was CIA’s field commander in Afghanistan, informs us about  hisexperience with  the Northern Alliance as follows:  “ I know from my experience that Persians and their Afghan cousins are all carpet salesman at heart.”  By implication, Berntsen believed  that the commanders of Northern Alliance would sell Afghanistan like a carpet.  On October 30, 2001, Commander-in Chief of the U.S. Central Command General Tommy Franks arrived in Tashkent, where Fahim and his treasury minister Aref were waiting for him. Shortly  before the meeting, Tommy Franks said to the CIA agent Berntsen: “Time to discuss the price of rugs” with the two Northern Alliance leaders. When Fahim wanted more money, Franks call this try “Bullshit”! (General Tommy Franks (2004, pp 309-311). All the facts, ideas and assumptions presented here shall lead to the following conclusion.

 

Conclusion

 

For all their geopolitical games,  colonialism and imperialism have been relying on minorities. The Northern Alliance in Afghanistan  under the leadership of “Great” Ahmad Shah Massoud is an example par excellence. U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had said that “In politics, nothing ever happens by accident. If happened, you can bet it was planned that way.” (Quoted in Moore and Slater, 2003, p. 323). Roosevelt  came from an aristocratic and political family, was Harvard law student, corporate lawyer, State Senator, Assistant Secretary of Navy, Governor of New York, and he was  the only U.S. President to be elected four times (1932-45). In addition,  he led his country through difficult times: the Great Depression and the World War II (1941-1945).

 

Roosevelt killed two birds with one stone:  His war was good for defeating both the depression and Hitler. Based on President Roosevelt’s extensive political experience, I cannot but to agree with his aforementioned statement. His wisdom, judgment and political maturity, as expressed in his statement, are reinforcing my thesis:  Since 1992 the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has deliberately lowered the socio-linguistic statistics of the resistant majority Pashtuns while it has inflated the ethnic and linguistic population size of the Afghan minorities mostly subservient to the U.S. government’s imperial needs. The anti-Pashtun Northern Alliance under the leadership of Massoud had played the same  role for the realization of the Soviet/Russian  interests in Afghanistan. Practically, he was the fifth column of foreign powers to undermine the Afghan nation’s solidarity.

 

CIA’s estimates for ethnic and linguistic statistics in Afghanistan are not without serious consequences for majority Pashtuns, whose demographics had been reduced since July of 1992, the year in which the pro-Tajik Massoud-Rabani team grabbed power in Kabul with the help of Communist generals belonging to the very pro-Soviet Babrak  Karmal’s faction.  The  CIA’s estimates for Afghan demographics will be used to determine quotas for a new privileged but client elite in Afghanistan. For example, a non-Pashtun Afghan-American familiar with the campus  of the Stanford University in California informed me in mid-2012 that among the students from Afghanistan there  was an “irrelevant minority” (ta’dad-e nachiz) of  Pashtun heritage.

However, even if the current regime in Kabul issues electronic Identity Cards, the probability of corruption and fraud could be very high as the current regime is effectively controlled by the lieutenants of the late Ahmad Shah Massoud (see below attachment).  The electronic cards need to be prepared and administered when foreign forces and the Northern Alliance do not control the current regime in Kabul. Then, the problem of socio-linguistic statistics can be resolved through electronic identity cards. However, the current colonial, mercenary and multi-dimensional corrupt regime is unable to issue electronic national identity cards.  A legitimate, honorable and trustworthy national government will have the capacity to issue such cards. These cards shall include: (1)  both   parts of identity: ethnicity and language;  (2) they shall be finger printed; and (3)  the biographical data on the card shall be machine/computer readable; For  illustration purposes, I suggest the following design:

 

AFG8KR, RE-PN9ZSF93837456

Name: Zalanda Samsor

Gender: Female

Nationality: Afghan

Ethnicity:  Pashtun,Hazara, etc

Language: Pashto, Turkmani, Uzbaki, etc.

Mother Language: Pashto, Degani, etc.

Father: Sambal Redai

Born: 1352(1973) in Asmar, Kunar

 

AFG stands for Afghan; 8 is the number assigned to Kunar province, KR stands for

Kunar province; 9 is the number assigned to the neighboring province Nangarhar; RE stands for Region East; PN stands for Pashtun; and ZSF stands for Zalanda Samsor, Female.

 

Attachment under Scrutiny

 

Below see “tazkera” (Identity Card) for Afghans presented by the Ministry of Interior Affairs of the puppet regime in Kabul.  The heading of the ID card is printed in

Dari  only although article 16 of  the colonial constitution of the Kabul regime mentions Pashto first and Dari second as the formal languages of the state.  Other information on the ID card  is printed first in Dari followed by Pashto translation. I discovered four errors in the Pashto text:

معلومات چه د کورنیو چارو[ د] وزارت په معلوماتی مرکز …. د ولسوالی [ ولسوالۍ ] کوډ…. د     زیژیـډلو[زیـږیـدنې/ زیـږیـدلو] کال

 

These defects exemplify not only negligence but also the intention to damage the social and political prestige   of Pashto language, which has the home-grown energy for the national identity of Afghanistan. Also, the word “wagarri” hardly represent the meaning of “atba’ ” (citizens). The word “Wagarri” means people (wolas, khalk).

تبعه( وګړی)، اتباع=وګړي (ولس،خلک). د «هیوادوال» ټکی پوخ سیاسي مفهوم لري، یانې په خپل هیواد کې د برخې، مسولیت او پریکړې خاوند.ځما وړاندیز دادی چې تذکرې ته دې «هـویتـپاڼه» وویل شي او تبعه/اتباعو/وګړو ته دې هیواد وال/هیوادوالان وویل شي. ګوندې په دې اکله پښتو ټولنه خپله چار پوهنه وکارولی شي.

I do not like the word “taba’” (singular for citizen) and “atba’ ” (plural for citizens).The word  taba’  implies  passivity, dependency and submission; however,  the words “hewadwal” (citizen)and its plural (“hewadwalan”) imply political participation, responsibility  and the ownership of the country, not of a city, district, or province.

 

 

Bibliography   

zirakyar1234@yahoo.com

Afghan, Samsor, The Second Saqawi [anarchy, chaos]. (First ed. 1998, 2nd ed. 2001), in Pashto. Second edition includes 414 pages.

 

سمسور افغان، دویمه سقاوي. لومړئ چاپ ۱۳۷۷ لمریز(۱۹۹۸)، دوهم چاپ ۱۳۷۹ لمریز(۲۰۰۱). خپرندوی: د افغانستان د کلتوري ودې ټولنه، جرمني. دوهم چاپ په ۴۱۴ مخونو کې.

Afghan, Sayed  Jamaluddin (1837-1897), in his book “Tatmatul Bayan Fi Tarikhul Afghan”, referenced in: Sediqullah Reshtin, New Reseach (Peshawar/Pashtunkhwa, 1979, p. 98), quoted in Wak (1998)/see below.

 

صدیق الله رښتین، نوې څیـړنې(پیښور، پښتونخوا، ۱۹۷۹، مخ ۹۸ )/ د افغانستان  قــومي جوړښت د افغانستان لپاره د واک فونډیشن شپـږ کلنه(۱۹۹۶-۱۹۹۱)  سروې او څیـړنه. لمریز  ۱۳۷۷=   ۱۱مخ، ۱۹۹۸

Area Handbook for Afghanistan (Washington, DC, 4th edition, 1973).

 

Aryana Encyclopedia (da aryana daieratul ma’aref, Kabul 2012):

«دافغانستان ملی اتنیکی جوړښت چې په دې وروستیو کې څرګند شوی او په لاندې ډول وړاندی کیـږي: پښتانه ۶۲،۷۳، تاجک ۱۲،۳۸، هزاره  ۹،۰۰، ازبک ۶،۱۰، ترکمن ۲،۶۹، ایماق ۲،۶۸….»- مخ ۴۵۵، اریانا دایـرة المعارف

 

 

Arnold, Anthony, (Afghanistan’s Two Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq. Stanford  University, California,  1983.

 

Berntsen, Gary,  Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaida, 2005).

 

CIA World Fact Book  (1981-2012 = 1360-1391 Solar Hijri).

 

DeLong, Michael  with Noah Lukeman, Inside the CentCom: The Unvanished Truth about the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 20004).

 

Derbyshire, J.D. and Jan Derbyshire (Political Systems of the World. First published in 1989 by W & R Chambers. Second edition-revised and expanded-published in the United Kingdom 1996 by Helicon Publishing Ltd. First published in the USA in 1996 by St. Martin’s Press in New York.

 

Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. III (South Asia/Paul Hockings volume editor. Boston Massachusetts: G.H. Hall & Co/Macmillan Inc, 1992).

 

Franks, Tommy, American Soldier. (New York, NY: 2004).

 

French sources:

Encylopedia de L’Agora (2013); Le petit Larousse (2011); Larousse Encyclopedique (2007); Atlas Economique Mondial (2000).

 

www.hewad.com  has published the late Afghan Academician Abdul Shakur Rashad’s tabulation as a reaction to the false demographics published in the CIA Word Fact Book in July 1992.

Huntington, Samuel , “The Clash of Civilizations?” (Foreign Affairs, summer 1993-expanded to a book in 1996).

 

Jervis, Robert, “Intelligence and Foreign Policy,” International Security( winter 1986-1987).

 

Lewis, Bernard, “The Roots of Muslim Rage” (Atlantic Magazine, 1990).

 

Magnus, Ralph H. and Eden Naby, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx and Mujahid. Boulder Colorado: Westview Press/Perseus Books, 1998.

 

Margolis, Eric, American Raj: Liberation or Domination? Resolving the Conflict Between the West and the Muslim World (Key Porter Books, 2008).

 

Moore, James and Wayne  Slater, Bush’s Brain.  (John  Wiley and Sons, 2003).

 

Nyrop, Richard F. and Donald M. Seekins (Afghanistan: A Country Study. 2001. Electronic Version (2012).

 

Reshtin, Sediqullah (see above: Afghani, Sayed  Jamaluddin ).

 

Richardson, Bruce G., who traveled to Afghanistan in 1986, 1987, 1990,1991and 1997, has many Afghanistan-related publications, such as  these important to my research paper:  Afghanistan: A Search for Truth (New York: Free Forum, 2009); Afghanistan, Ending the Reign of Soviet Terror (Bend, OR: Maverick, 1996); From Archives: In Quest for a ‘Greater Tajikistan’ (May 31, 2011); Ethno-centric Russian and U.S. Strategies in Afghanistan; Redrawing Map, Altering the Ethnographic Character of Afghanistan (2012); “A Noteworthy Narrative, Dispelling Partisan and Politically Expedient Mythology” (April 14, 2013); Discriminatory Ethno-Centric Russian and U.S. Strategies Imperil Afghanistan (April 25, 2013).

 

 

Sarif, Gul Janan , Das Afghanische Schulwesen (Ph.D. thesis), Von Goethe University, Farnkfurt am Main, Germany, 1972.

 

Schurmann, H.F., The Moghl of Afghanistan,1962.

 

Stanizai, Zaman,“From Identity Crisis to Identity in Crisis in Afghanistan”. Electronic version: December 16, 2009  http://www.stanizai.org/     [November 15, 2012].

 

Wak, Mohammad Enam, The Ethnic Composition of Afghanistan: A Six-year Survey and Research project: 1991- July 1996.Peshawar, Pashtunkhwa (Sapi’s Center for Pashto Research and Development), 1998= 1377 A.H. (In Pashto). Its compact English version was published in Peshawar, Pashtunkhwa (Khatiz Organization for Rehabilitation, July 1999).

 

Wilber, D.N., Afghanistan: Its people, its society, its culture, 1962.

 

Woodward, Bob, Bush at War, Simon and Schuster, 2002.

 

Zakaria,  Fareed, the host of “Global Public Square” program at CNN (April 11, 2010) was discussing with Peter Galbraith (former U.N. Representative to Afghanistan).

 

Zirakyar, Rahmat “Pashtun-Bashing in Kite Runner: A Psychological Operation?” , December 9, 2009.  Electronic Version.

Zirakyar, Rahmat  Language from Adam to Present, in Pashto (December 2010 = Linda 1389 Solar A.H.). Electronic version, published by  www.nahimi.dk/pashto/

زیرکیار، رحمت ربی، ژبه له بابا ادمه تر دې دمه ( لینده ۱۳۸۹ لمریز= دسمبر ۲۰۱۰). الکترانیک چاپ: www.nahimi.dk/pashto/

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An Afghan Poet Shapes Metal and Hard Words

turab

By 

KHOST, Afghanistan — The poet guided a strip of sheet metal into the ancient steel clippers, cutting shimmering triangles that fell with a dull clang on the shop floor.

In the background, a workman’s chorus filled the yard: a handsaw planing a log beam; a generator humming and catching; the groan of a giant diesel truck idling.

The harsh music of the workday welled up around Matiullah Turab, one of Afghanistan’s most famous Pashtun poets, in the garage where he earns a living repairing the colorful Pakistani caravan trucks that transport goods around the countryside.

The cadence of his nights, though, is his own: shaping poetry as hard and piercing as the tools he uses by day. Nature and romance carry no interest for him.

“A poet’s job is not to write about love,” he growled, his booming voice blending with the ambient noise of the workshop. “A poet’s job is not to write about flowers. A poet must write about the plight and pain of the people.”

With his unflinching words, Mr. Turab, 44, offers a voice for Afghans grown cynical about the war and its perpetrators: the Americans, the Taliban, the Afghan government, Pakistan.

War has turned into a trade

Heads have been sold

as if they weigh like cotton,

and at the scale sit such judges

who taste the blood, then decide the price

Taped versions of Mr. Turab’s poems spread virally, especially among his fellow ethnic Pashtuns, whom he unabashedly champions — a tribal affinity that alienates some Tajik and Hazara listeners. His close affiliation with Hezb-i-Islami — part Islamist political party, part militant group — has put off others.

But even as his social affiliations are narrow and divisive, his poetry has mass appeal. Mr. Turab reserves his charity for ordinary Afghans, weighed down by the grinding corruption and disappointment that have come to define the last decade of their lives.

Many see his poems, some of which were translated from Pashto for The New York Times by Mujib Mashal, as a counter to the daily spin showered on Afghans by the government, diplomats, religious leaders and the media.

O flag-bearers of the world,

you have pained us a lot in the name of security

You cry of peace and security,

and you dispatch guns and ammunition

Seated on a makeshift bench, his wool pakol hat tilted slightly and his clothing stained with grease, Mr. Turab surveyed the evening beyond his concrete workshop bay, a landscape of rags, wires and waste. The squalid heat was broken intermittently by a standing fan connected to a car battery. A neighboring vendor hammered a glacier of ice, cleaving chunks to sell to drivers passing by.

“There is no genuine politician in Afghanistan,” he said, briefly cracking a rare smile. “As far as I know, politicians need the support of the people, and none of these politicians have that. For me, they are like the shareholders of a business. They only think of themselves and their profit.”

He continued: “The Taliban are not the solution, either. Gone are those old days when the Taliban way of governing worked.”

He has no patience for preciousness in his own work or in others’, and he is particularly merciless with government officials. He ridicules them, saying they should stitch three pockets into their jackets: one to collect afghanis, one for dollars and a third for Pakistani rupees.

For all that disdain, however, Mr. Turab has remained popular in influential corners of the government. And President Hamid Karzai recently invited him to the presidential palace in Kabul.

“The president liked my poetry and told me I had an excellent voice, but I don’t know why,” he said. “I criticized him.”

In fact, he is quite widely in demand. Though he prefers to be home in Khost, Mr. Turab’s travel schedule still far outpaces the average metalsmith’s. People flock to his rare personal readings, and new poems posted on YouTube quickly become among the most-watched by Afghans. He is planning a trip to Moscow soon to receive an award from members of the Afghan diaspora there. And he visits the governor of Paktia, a friend, to perform on occasion.

Mr. Turab is the latest in a long roll call of poets cherished in Afghanistan, among the most famous of them Rumi, the Sufi mystic whose works of love and faith remain popular across the world. In this country, poetic aphorisms are woven into everyday talk, embraced by Afghans from all walks of life. In pockets of Kabul, it is not uncommon to see men bunched together as they transfer audio files of readings over Bluetooth from one cellphone to another.

Though poetry is loved, it seldom pays. Some writers have taken government jobs, finding the steady paycheck and modest responsibilities conducive to their work. Mr. Turab, for his part, has stuck to his dingy garage on the outskirts of Khost City.

“This is my life, what you see here: banging iron, cutting it short, making it long,” he said. “I still don’t call myself a poet.”

After the Soviet invasion in 1979, Mr. Turab, a teenager at the time, moved with his family to Pakistan. He came of age there, returning to Afghanistan only two decades later, with a trade, a wife and a modest following as a poet.

He kept refining his craft after his return, cultivating a broader audience. Under Taliban rule, he dared to publish a book of his work — a grave mistake.

“The Taliban beat me very badly,” he said, shaking his head, then proffering a smile. “After that, I decided publishing wasn’t such a good idea.”

Though he is an unabashed Pashtun loyalist, he has no love for the Taliban, who are closely identified with Pashtun tribes. He says he loathes the terror they cultivate and the way they have destabilized Afghanistan. And he excoriates them, for being as inept and out of touch as the Western-backed government.

O graveyard of skulls and oppression

Rip this earth open and come out

They taunt me with your blood,

and you lie intoxicated with thoughts of virgins

The dirt road outside his shop runs all the way to Pakistan, and its traffic is an economic lifeline. Vendors line the highway, selling everything from snow to keep the blistering heat at bay to seasonal fruit. Periodically a convoy of American vehicles passes, breaking the spell of an otherwise Afghan scene.

“Sometimes I’m amazed that things aren’t falling apart,” he said, clasping his hands together as he reflected on years of war and foreign presence here. “But then I realize there is a social law here that holds the country together, even if there is no governmental law.”

Though he has been critical of the American occupation, he does note the progress that has come with it: roads, electricity and schools. It is other parts of the Western legacy in Afghanistan that he worries about.

“Democracy will hurt and eliminate our tribal laws,” he said. “The medicine prescribed by democracy was not suitable for this society’s sickness.”

There is something else, which even the plain-spoken Mr. Turab seemed reluctant to confess: He is nearly illiterate. Though he can, with difficulty, read printed copy, he can neither write nor read the handwriting of others, he said. He constructs his poetry in his head, relying on memory to retain it and others to record it.

Mr. Turab grew up in a small village of Nangarhar Province, poor even by Afghan standards. His father was a farmer, and grew just enough to feed the family. Though they had little, he fondly remembers his youth — particularly the days spent learning from the village poet, a man he grew to love for his sharp words and honesty.

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Assassinations and CIA Drug Money

Bruce G. Richardson

CIA: Global Drug Trafficking, Terrorist Affiliations, Political Assassination…Resolution by other (Unlawful, Unethical and Immoral) Means

Assassination is one of the oldest tools of power-politics, dating back as far as recorded history.

Osama bin Laden: The execution-style killing of Osama bin Laden on May 1st in Abbottabad, Pakistan has raised objections and outrage among acclaimed jurisprudents worldwide. Referring to the killing as “murder” and or “political-assassination,” debate among jurists has fueled the fires of criticism against the Obama Administration’s extra-legal foreign policies. To deflect international criticism, and to preserve the American people’s support for a seemingly senseless and endless war, the Obama Administration and their accomplices in the media have embarked on an amorphous game of legal-semantics. Assassination proscribed under U.S. and international law, is now cast in terms of “targeted killing” in administration-legalese. “Targeted killing” is the more recently- coined euphemism for sanctioned murder, and as was “collateral damage”, devised to blunt criticism for the unwarranted and indiscriminate slaughter of civilians by the U.S. military.

Self Defense?: Administration lawyers using highly-questionable legal interpretations that as yet have not been adjudicated in a court of law, as with the latent controversy over torture, have taken the position that so-called “targeted killing” is lawful under national and international statutes as a tool of self-defense in the war on terror. Under this Draconian self-serving legal interpretation, civilian casualties and deaths have risen 23% over this same period one year ago according to a UN report. This, a frequent tactic of Israel and the U.S. raises complex questions and leads to contentious disputes, as to the legal and moral basis for its application. Would history and the rule of law have not been better served with a public trial of Osama bin Laden in a court of law?

Benazir Bhutto: An assassin’s bullet took the life of former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007. On September 28, 2009, General Mirza Aslam Beg, Pakistan’s former Army Chief of Staff said that CIA contractor Blackwater was directly involved in the assassination of former Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. He said that Pakistan’s President Musharraf had given Blackwater permission to carry out terrorist operations in the cities of Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Peshawar, and Quetta. In an Al-Jazeera TV interview the general said that the U.S. killed Benazir Bhutto when she violated an agreement she had with the CIA… to not return to Pakistan. General Beg was Army Chief of Staff during Bhutto’s first administration. See: (Washington Post, 1/18/08 and Al-Jazeera, 9/28/2009). A highly controversial figure, the Prime Minister was thought a corrupt official and was known to traffic in stolen antiquities. Some of Afghanistan’s most rare and historic treasures were in her possession. Among her collection of rare antiquities were the world-renowned “Begrami-Ivories”, but to the chagrin of Afghan antiquities curatorial activists, without benefit of legal title. The Begrami-Ivories are believed to date from the Kushan period.

Notwithstanding the fact that Baitullah Mehsud is the alleged shooter, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, M. Shah Mahmoud has asked for a full investigation of CIA complicity by the United Nations. A recent poll of the people of Pakistan indicated that a majority believe President Musharraf ordered the assassination of Benazir Bhutto at the behest of the CIA. (See: South Asian Analysis Group, #287, Pakistan’s ISI, B. Rahman, 2001, and Dawn, Yousaf Nazar, 1/31/2008).

Ahmad Shah Massoud: Assassinated on September 9, 2001. Well-informed political commentators have long held that the assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud at the hands of Tunisian/al-Qaeda operatives was but self-serving propaganda, a tactic of the information-war. Representatives of the Northern Alliance lost no time in accusing the Taliban and al-Qaeda of the incident. But as the recent Oslo terrorist attack clearly demonstrates, there are those who seize what they view as an opportunity to accuse their enemies for political advantage. The Western media and President Obama, for example…immediately accused Muslims for the carnage that turned out to be by the hand of a deranged right-wing Christian fundamentalist.

Truth however, in time, is generally revealed. In the years following Massoud’s death, Belgian and French investigators arrested various individuals for the complicity in the assassination. However, the European investigators did not address critical questions about how the operation played out on the ground. How did two al-Qaeda operatives gain proximity to Massoud, bypassing the rigid screening process routinely employed and required to reach Massoud? How did they get the explosives through various layers of physical screening and bring them into Massoud’s presence? The assassin’s cameras were allegedly “stuffed with explosives.” Yet it has recently been shown that Massoud’s security apparatus was in possession of the latest incarnation of high-tech “explosives sniffers,” a gift from his CIA handlers, technology that would with certainty reveal [any] presence of explosives. We know too that Rasul Sayyaf facilitated the entrance of the assassins into Northern Afghanistan and that Mohammad Qasim Fahim failed to vet the foreign visitors as was his responsibility. So, it would seem that two imposters, fake journalists from Tunisia, posing as Moroccans with Belgian passports, along with their equipment , including the cameras they proposed to use to record their interview with Massoud…were never physically screened.

A lone assassin survived the blast that took the life of Ahmad Shah Massoud and one of the alleged assassins, but curiously…was shot while allegedly trying to escape… conveniently taking his secrets along with himself to his grave… forever silenced.

As heretofore reported; in June of 2007, Ambassador Massoud Khalili, as sole survivor, told the (Indian Press) that he observed a “bright streak of light”, a telltale, recognized-signature generated by super-heated exhaust gasses emanating from a rocket’s motor, just moments before the explosion. (See: Afghanistan, a Search for Truth, Bruce G. Richardson, 2009, p.47 and Jane’s Defense Weekly, Missile Signatures, 11/27/01).

It has been therefore concluded in many circles that Massoud’s death was advanced by the personal and political ambitions of key figures in the Northern Alliance. High-profile figures such as the wily Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, so adored by the Western media, and “Marshall” Fahim, now serving as President Hamid Karzai’s First Vice President, both of whom now well-positioned for upward political mobility as a result of Massoud’s assassination. In addition, other casus belli are present: a long-standing and vitriolic disputation surrounding vast financial holdings in real-estate and bank accounts have been a major bone of contention between Ahmad Shah Massoud and others of Jamiat’s-hierarchy. (See: The Real Winner of Afghanistan’s Election, Foreign Policy, H.M. Leverett, Afghan Post, 2008).

Dr. Abdur Rahman: Assassinated on February 14, 2002. In an article entitled: The Assassination of the Man with Two Names, Bruce G. Richardson, (See: DAWAT, English Edition and Afghan/German Online, Pashto edition: translation by Rahmat Arya, July, 2011),and according to Abdul Hai Warshan, a close friend of Massoud, “the motive behind his assassination was linked to the fact that Dr. Abdur Rahman was opening up and revealing details of Ahmad Shah Massoud’s past contacts and cooperation with the KGB, CIA, India, Iran, and other intelligence agencies. He did not support Massoud in his war against the Taliban and was opposed to the pro-Russia policies of Shura-i-Nizar.” (See: War without end, Behroz Khan, Newsline, March, 2002, and see: Afghanistan, Political Frailty and External Interference, Dr. Nabi Misdaq, 2006, p. 212, and American Raj, Liberation or Domination, Resolving the Conflict between the West and the Muslim World, Eric S. Margolis, 2008, p. 196).

Relatives of the slain minister believe that Muhamad Younis Qanooni, Muhammad Qasim Fahim and Dr. Abdullah-Abdullah were responsible for his death in order to silence his criticism and expose over their respective participation in and collaboration with the Soviets, and as well, with India and Russia. (See: Afghanistan, a Search for Truth, Bruce G. Richardson, 2009, p.104, and American Raj, Liberation or Domination, Resolving the Conflict between the West and the Muslim World, Eric S. Margolis, 2008, p.196).

In addition to previously cited sources, S. Frederick Starr, chairman of the Central Asia Institute at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at John Hopkins University and Martin Strmecki, President of the Roosevelt Foundation, wrote in the (February 26, 2002 edition of the Wall Street Journal under the title: Time to Ditch the Northern Alliance), “that it was the Northern Alliance themselves that successfully engineered the assassination of the slain Minister of Civil Aviation and Tourism.”

War on Drugs: From American War Machine, Former diplomat, internationally acclaimed political scientist and Professor Emeritus of English at the University of California, Berkeley, author Peter Dale Scott writes:

“Beginning with Thailand in the 1950s, Americans have become inured to the CIA’s alliances with known terrorists, drug traffickers (and their bankers) to install and sustain right-wing governments, The modus- operandi has repeated itself in Laos, Vietnam, Italy, Mexico, Thailand, Nigeria, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Panama, Honduras, Turkey, Pakistan and now Afghanistan. The relationship of the U.S. intelligence operations and agencies to the global drug traffic, al-Qaeda, and to other criminal networks deserves greater attention in the debate over the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. After World War II, the United States, along with Britain and France, recurrently used both drug networks and terrorist groups as assets or proxies in the Cold War. By backing these groups, the great powers greatly increased the power and scope of both the drug traffic and terrorist groups. As a result, in the long run, they contributed to powerful forces that weakened the rule of law internationally and domestically.”

America’s wars on terror and drugs consist of both an amorphous structure and hypocritical DNA. When Obama visited Afghanistan in 2008, Gul Agha Shirzai was the first Afghan leader he met. The (London Observer reported on July 21, 2002), that in order to secure his acceptance of the new Karzai Government, Gul Agha Shirzai, along with other drug and warlords, had been “bought off” with millions of dollars in deals brokered by U.S. and British Intelligence. (See: American War Machine, Deep politics, the CIA Global Drug Connections and the Road to Afghanistan, Peter Dale Scott, 2010).

Unbeknownst to many Americans, and as a casualty of the information-war, the Taliban had virtually eliminated the production of opiates and heroin manufacture. Yet with the homogenized rendering of nightly newscasts across America, both the Bush and Obama Administrations alleged that the principal source of funding for the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan was derived from drug trafficking. An obvious dalliance with the truth with the intent to further demonize and de-legitimize the Taliban and others who resist the American occupation in the eyes of the American public, and to justify a war against a country and a people that cannot by any measure or reasonable standard be justified… and furthermore; a country and a people that had not [ever] threatened nor harmed the interests and or security of the U.S.

In addition to and in spite of America’s murky anti-terrorist and drug-DNA, manifest with the recruitment of known war criminals such as Rashid Dostum and others of the nefarious Northern Alliance, who were recruited and bribed with $500,000 in “stacks of newly-printed $100-dollar bills”, a first installment of a multitude of cash incentives by CIA operatives to further America’s grip on Afghanistan. And in recognition of the ancient proverbs: “don’t do what I do, do what I say, and the end justifies the means”, contrary to their public stance and rhetoric, America, throughout its history, has allied itself with the dregs of society, i.e., war criminals, drug lords, communists and terrorists. (See: First In, An Insider’s account of how the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan, Gary C. Schroen, 2005, p. 92, and Ghost Wars, Steve Coll, 2004, pp. 467 and 494).

American officials, however, were cautious, concerned over the fact that the Northern Alliance engaged in “major drug trafficking”, and worried about the potential political fallout once the obvious hypocrisy incorporated in their statecraft bridged the public’s-information chasm, a chasm that exists between professed and actual government policies. Yet, in the final analysis, history attests that the Northern Alliance, allied with their co-ethnic proxy-mercenaries from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, were utilized in a combat-support role (war crimes and drug trafficking notwithstanding) to provide both target coordinates of Taliban positions and troops to fight alongside American forces against the Taliban. (See: The Main Enemy, Milt Bearden, and James Risen, 2003 and American War Machine, and Deep Politics, the CIA Global Drug Connection, and the Road to Afghanistan, Peter Dale Scott, pp. 23,25, 236, 2010).

Beneficiaries, real as opposed to imagined and or alleged from opium trafficking:

On November 21, 2005, Uzbek President Islam Karimov evicted the American military from their base of operations in Kush-Khanabad under a status-of-force codicil incorporated in the “tenant” basing agreement. The airbase had been used by the U.S. for operations against Afghanistan. The reason given for the expulsion was that American aircraft bound for Europe and other destinations were known to be laden with opium. Sources speculate that this move by Karimov, under extraordinary pressure from Russia, itself worried about the burgeoning illicit drug activity in their own backyard, and the close proximity of NATO forces, may have also been in retaliation for the U.S. calling for a UN special investigation into the Karimov’s Administration’s brutal response to demonstrators by their security forces during the uprising in Andijan. (See: Global Research, 11/21/05).

Witnesses have revealed that American military aircraft flying out from Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan have as well been observed transporting drugs. Author of (American War Machine), Peter Dale Scott, and Alfred W. McCoy, author of (The Politics of Heroin, CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, 2003), provide a detailed listing of major American banks that have made billions by laundering drug profits from opium originating in Afghanistan. In addition, allegations have surfaced that the U.S. is financing its war in Afghanistan with drug profits. From a former Russian general with Cold War experience in Afghanistan:

“Americans themselves admit that drugs are often transported out of Afghanistan on American planes. Drug trafficking in Afghanistan brings them about 50 billion a year…which fully covers the expenses tied to keeping its troops there. Essentially, they are not going to interfere and stop production of drugs.” (See: Afghan Drug Trafficking Brings U.S. $50 Billion a Year, General Mahmut Gareev, Russia Today, 8/20/09).

The blatant hypocrisy extant with America’s wars of terror and drugs are profoundly manifest with the widely published recruitment of known war criminals, and with irrefutable photographic evidence as published on the cover of Peter Dale Scott’s book, American War Machine; a provocative photograph depicts a contingent of U.S. Marines engaged in guarding, as opposed to destroying, a poppy field in Afghanistan.

Bruce G. Richardson

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Saw a news clip where Hamid Karzai says that Mullah Omar can contest Afghanistan election. The only problem is that no one has seen or heard from Mullah Omar for many years now. Second problem is that Taliban has never accepted the constitution of Afghanistan that has been dictated by Northern Alliance together with “Invading Nations”. Looking back to the previous elections we can remember that Taliban banned and attacked voters going to voting stations. How likely will it be that Mullah Omar will take part in Afghanistan’s elections?

 

BERLIN: Afghan President Hamid Karzai has told a German newspaper that Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar could run for president in elections next year.

Karzai’s government has agreed the Taliban can open an office in Qatar if the group breaks all ties with al Qaeda and renounces terrorism. Karzai was in Qatar Sunday to discuss the issue.

Karzai said in an interview published Tuesday by the German daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung that authorities have “sporadic contacts” with the Taliban. He said that the Afghan constitution is valid for all Afghans and “the Taliban also should benefit from it.”

Asked whether Mullah Omar should seek the presidency, Karzai was quoted as saying: “He can become a candidate for the presidency and give Afghans the opportunity to vote for or against him.”

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obaidullah obaid minister of higher education

obaidullah obaid minister of higher education

 

The Afghan minister of higher education Obaidullah Obaid was recently exposed by buying a car for more 7,7 million afghanis. By digging deeper it showed up that he had granted and sent 1000 Hazaras to Malaysia by selling scholarships to them.  By favoring  and take a stand for the Hazara and simultaneously discriminate Pashtoons has proved to be a profitable business idea. The corruption in Afghanistan has started to take place in all ministries and on every level. Obaidullah Obaid has not only gained money but also taken a political position by helping Hazara to higher education. A recent report published by United Nations indicates that cost of corruption in Afghanistan is nearly $4 billion.
Extract from that report below:

The total cost of corruption in Afghanistan has significantly increased over the past three years to $3.9 billion, according to a United Nations survey released today, which says that in spite of fewer people paying bribes, the practice is still having detrimental effects due to its frequency.

In 2012, half of Afghan citizens paid a bribe while requesting a public service and nearly 30 per cent of them paid a bribe for a private sector service, states the survey on trends and patterns of corruption produced by the High Office for Oversight and Anticorruption and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

While these figures are high, there is evidence of progress, as 59 per cent of the adult population had to pay at least one bribe to a public official in 2009. However, the frequency of bribery has increased from 4.7 bribes to 5.6 bribes per bribe-payer and the average cost of a bribe has risen from $158 to $214, a 29 per cent increase in real terms.

“The bribes that Afghan citizens paid in 2012 equals double Afghanistan’s domestic revenue or one fourth of the Tokyo pledge,” said the UNODC Regional Representative, Jean Luc Lemahieu, referring to the international donors’ conference held in Japan in July, in which $16 billion was pledged for Afghanistan’s economic development in the next four years on the condition that the Government reduce corruption before receiving all of the money.

“Nobody doubts the seriousness of the issue, the art is to design the correct strategy to remedy the situation,” said Mr. Lemahieu.

While corruption is seen by most Afghans as one of the most urgent challenges facing their country, it seems to be increasingly embedded in social practices, with patronage and bribery being an acceptable part of day-to-day life.

The survey, which was based on a sample of 6,700 Afghan citizens over the age of 18 across the country, stated that 68 per cent of those interviewed considered it acceptable for a civil servant to top up a low salary by accepting small bribes from service users. Similarly, 67 per cent of citizens considered it sometimes acceptable for a civil servant to be recruited on the basis of family ties and friendship networks.

In most cases, bribes are paid to obtain better or faster services, while in others bribes are offered to influence deliberations and actions such as police activities and judicial decisions, thereby eroding the rule of law and trust in institutions.

In particular, the survey points to the education sector as one of the most vulnerable to corruption, with the percentage of those paying a bribe to a teacher jumping from 16 per cent in 2009 to 51 per cent in 2012.

“Afghans know that corruption is eating at the fabric of their society,” said Mr. Lemahieu. “The solution is not only to be found within the Government but also within the wider community.” Source: UN

 

مالیزیا پوهنتونو کی ۱۰۰۰ هزاره ګان بورسیه شول

اوس اوس مالیزیاته په رسمي سفر او یو بانکي ټریننګ ته تللی وم. او زما چی په دی غل وزیر ډیر باور وو، خو زه دده په څیره غولیدلی وم. د عالي تحصیلات وزیر څومره وخت مخکی مالیزیا ته تشریف راوړی وو. او دده پرځای چی د مالیزیا د حکومته د کومک غوښتنه وکړی، ده په خلاصه سینه ورته وویلی چی ما لا تر اوسه خپله بودیجه ۴۰ فیصده هم نده خلاصه کړی. او غواړم چی افغان محصلین مالیزیا ته په پخپله بودیجه راواستوم.
د مالیزیا د عالي تحصیلاتو وزیرچی خدای خدای یی کاوه چی افغانستان ورڅخه د دوه دری زرو محصلینو لپاره سکالرشپ ونه غواړي، د افغان وزیر نه سخت خوشاله شو، عبید جان ورته زیاته کړه، موږ ډیری پیسی لرو او غواړو چی خپل محصلین دلته وروځو. د مالیزیا وزیر به حتما ځان سره فکر کاوه چی موږ خو هر کال په ملیونو ډالر لګوو چی حکومتی محصلین مالیزیا ته را جزب کړو او روزانه په کویټ او سعودی کی ناست او خدا خدای کوو چی عربان به خپل بچیان دلته راولیږي. ته [وزیر] راغلی یی چی د افغانستان بودیجه دلته مصرف کړی، داخو موږ باندی اسماني رحمت دی. رازه موږ به هم تا ونازه وو. اوس نو ته پوهیږی او کار دی.
بالاخره د مالیزیا د وزیر اجازی ته خو ضرورت هم نه وو ځکه چی د افغانستان عالي تحصیلاتو وزارت هر محصل ته ۲۵۰ ډالر اعاشه او ددوی اباته او د درس او کتاب او قلم پیسی مختلفو پوهنتونو ته جاري کړی.
خو. یو پوهنتون دیرش محصلین چی وزارت تکړه او نمرات یی د ۸۰ سلنی نه اوچتی ښولی وۍ په اصلی اسنادو کی یی توپیر او ۵۰ سلنی کمی وی. نو اسلامی پوهنتون دا چاڼ شوی او سفارتی سفارشی نالایقانو قبولی ورته ډیره مشکله وه. نو سفارت ته یی وی ویل که دا نور محصلین هم بیرته ځی بخیر دی ولاړ شي. د ۹۷۰ محصلینو لست چی پوهتنون پس د چاڼه ۳۷۰ ته راکوز کړی. یو فیصد محلصین هم د لست مطابق نمری نه درلودی.
وزارت او په کوالا لمپور کی د افغانستان جاهل سفارتیانو ۱۰۰۰ کسان یوازی د مالیزیا اسلامی پوهنتون ته د افغانستان فوق العاده محصلین معرفی کړی ول.
پوهنتون یو ځل بیا چاڼ پکی وکړ، او تقریبا ۲۵۰ محصلینوته یی قبولی ورکړه. محصلین پخیر راغلل. پوهنتون د ټولو اصلی اسناد وغوښتل. دوی وکتل چی ۹۹ فیصده معلومات ضد او نقیذ دی. هغه کسانو ته چی دوی یی معادل ۹۵ فیصده ښودلي وو، ۶۰ هم نه وو. نو بالآخره اسلامی پوهنتون چی د افغان وزارت د پیسو او بی ځایه واسطی قیصه کی نه وو، دیرمحصیلینو ته یی وویل چی تاسو یا کډی بار کړی او یا به مو یو وړوکی کالج باندی خرڅ کړو. دی دیرش بی سرنوشته محصلینو باره کی سفارتیانو او وزارتیانو وویل، اسلامی پوهنتونه خدای ته ګوره پرتوګ په سر مه راړوه، دا نالایقان چی په هرچا خرڅوی خرڅ یی کړی خو خدای ته ګورۍ چی کابل ته یی مه رالیږی ځکه دا ټول د وزیرانو خپلوان او د پارلمان د غړو او ددوی د خپلوانو ځامن دی په غم مو مه اړوه. نو د مالیزیا اسلامی پوهنتون هم دا نالیقان ټول په بل کالج وپلورل. د اسلامي پوهنتون پاتیشونکی لیست بیا سفارت نورو پوهنتونو ته رسما پیش کړی او د هغوی یی قبولیانی اخیستی.
خیر اوس ګوره چی څه به واوري.
په ۱۰۰۰ محصلینو کی ۴۰ پښتانه هم نشته. پوهنتون ته ویل شوی چی موږ د هر ولایت په سطحه په هر اینټیک کی د هر ولایت په سطحه دری محصلو ته بورس ورکړی. نو ته خپله فکر وکړه چی تاسو په ۱۰۰۰ بورسونو کی ۶۰۰ بورسونه د ازاره ګانو دی، ۲۵۰ تاجیکان او ۴۰ پښتانه بقیه نور اقلیتونه.
وزیر څه قسم ویش کړی. خو خیر سفارت هم خپل رول لوبولي، دوی هم خپل لست ور داخل کړی. سفارت وایی دا لست د وزارته راغلی او وزارت وایی د بعضی کسانو نه خبر نلري.
بیا جالبه داده چی د ۱۰۰۰ کسانو لپاره وزیر دوه اجینټان ټاکلی، چون د مالیزا د پوهنتونو د قانو په اساس یو اجنټ د یو محصل په سر د پوهنتونه ۵۰۰ ډالر حق الزحمه اخستی شی. نو پدی کی د پوهنتون یو استاد ورته معرفي شوی، نو اوس هغه استاد خو په ښکاره د هر افغان محصل په سر ۵۰۰ ډالر اخیستی، خودا چی دا استاد به په سفارت یا وزارت کی چاسره شریک وی، نو الله ته پته ده.
نوي افغان محصلین: په دویمه دریمه ورځ به دا محصلین په میترو کی لس او شل یو ځای چکر وتل. یوه میاشت مخکی دوه محصلینو شرط تړلی چی د میترو پټلی ته ور ودانګی، یو افغان محصل پټلی ته دانګلي او میټرو زر ترزره خلکو په چیغو او سرو ودرولي وه. پولیس راغلی ول او دواړه یی نیولي ول. دا یوه ورځ د مالیزیا په ټول اخبارونو کی راغلل او د افغان محصلینو فرهنګ یی مالیزیانو ته په خپل اول سمیستر کی معرفي کړ.
کرزی صاحب ته زه هیڅ نه وایم ځکه چی پدی وزیرانو چی څومره ه نازیږی هماغومره پښتانه ډغری خوري. خو نه پوهیږی چی د عالی تحصیلاتو وزیر به نور څومره ګلونه په نورو ملکو کی کرلي وي.

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Masoud and other Afghan criminals

Afghanistan’s Political Dilemma…Foreign-Cultivated, Co-opted Leadership
“Massoud worked for us, Massoud kept the Salang open for us…he would not allow anyone to attack us”…Mikhail Gorbachev, BBC World Pashto Service, February 15, 2004
Life is hard. Some things just defy all compassion, logic, reason and understanding, especially so for Afghans, a population constantly under siege in a war-torn country.
Since the advent of the Soviet/Afghan War (1979-1989), the political landscape of Afghanistan has been littered with the hopes, dreams and physical remains of those caught in the cross-fire between invading armies, proxy-militias, collaborators, warring factions and other political entities. Rising from the ashes which they helped to create, the Northern Alliance, with their troubled and sordid history have attempted to reinvent themselves. At a recent press-conference, presidential hopeful Dr. Abdullah Abdullah exclaimed that the “Government has done little to rebuild the economy, erect infrastructure and bring people out of enduring poverty during Karzai’s ten-years running the country.” But tortured logic and syntax by aspiring politicians with dubious, if not criminal credentials cannot alter the political reality and thereby regain the people’s confidence with empty sloganeering. The Northern Alliance or National Coalition have and remain the odds-on favorites of Russia, Iran, India and both the Bush and Obama Administrations. And in that role, they have overseen, aided and abetted the Soviet invasion and occupation as proxies, and presently serve as architects or mirror images of their Soviet incarnation for the American invasion and occupation. (1, 7, 8, 9) See: The Soldiers Story, Soviet Veterans Remember the Afghan War, Anna Heinamaa and Maija Leppanen, 1994, pp. 113-122.
It is as if one awoke from a bad dream or nightmare to find that the Northern Alliance, also known as, a.k.a. The National Coalition of Afghanistan is being groomed by the U.S. Administration to assume the mantle of power in Afghanistan. According to Human Rights Watch, at least 70 candidates with links to the Northern Alliance were on the 2009 presidential ballot. While election laws disallowed candidates with links to illegal armed groups, and the Karzai government had banned some 50 others that had been identified as members of illegal armed groups, many of the more powerful war lords simply bypassed this proscription by registering their militia as a private security company. Also, many of Karzai’s key allies are alleged to have committed widespread human rights violations and war crimes. Human Rights Watch has called for VP Karim Khalili and key ally, former Army Chief of Staff Abdul Rashid Dostum, to face a special court for alleged war crimes. Khalili is charged with the killing of thousands of innocent people. Karzai’s other Vice President, Mohammad Qasim Fahim and former Energy Minister Ismael Khan, have been named by human rights organizations as among the worst perpetrators. Marshall Fahim is accused of having served as a former communist secret police chief, murdering prisoners of war during the 1980s and participating in kidnappings and other crimes as well. (2)
The Marshall is also alleged to have ties to drug trafficking. As a critical ally of the U.S., Marshall Fahim worked closely with the CIA in the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan as he had with the Soviets during the Soviet/Afghan War, a pattern of foreign-collaboration that had been established by the late Shura-i-Nizar impresario, Ahmad Shah Massoud. (3, 7, 8, 9) See: Main Intelligence Directorate (MID) of the General Headquarters, USSR Armed Forces. Title: ‘The Lion of the Panjshir,’ Article no. 18, (No. 882/83-3-3-S-77, Fond 80, Perechen 14, Document 77), translation of excerpts by Elena Kretova Information Services, Moscow.
A majority of the Afghan people hate these powerbrokers, angered that they have evaded accountability for human rights abuses, Soviet collaboration, and regained power as proxies of the Soviets from 1979-1989, and presently the CIA from the 2001 U.S. invasion to the present. (3) See: Afghanistan, Political Frailty and External Interference, Dr. Nabi Misdaq, 2006, pp. 162, 203-213.
If the 2009 presidential election is an omen of future endeavors, than the 2014 election will be characterized by a lack of security, low voter turnout, and widespread ballot stuffing and other election fraud. It has been alleged that the CIA participated in ballot stuffing to secure a win for their man…Hamid Karzai. The Taliban called for a boycott of the 2009 contest describing it as a “program of the crusader” and “the American process.” (4)
When assessing a candidate’s qualifications for elected office, among the primary essentials are patriotism, a verifiable-absence of any record of the candidate acting in the commission of war crimes, a working knowledge of the cultural, social and economic needs of the people he or she purports to represent. Those from the Northern Alliance enmeshed in the 2014 election cycle therefore do not possess the necessary qualifications. While few would lament the passing of Hamid Karzai from the president’s foreign-supported mantle of power, fewer still can underwrite or vote for those candidates from the Northern Alliance, formerly known as the IOAP, Jamiat, Shura-i- Nizar, and presently, The National Coalition of Afghanistan.
The act of re-calibrating or re-naming a political entity is generally taken to hide past abuses of power, malfeasance, and or dereliction of duty from electoral scrutiny. Afghans cannot but recall that on 25 December 1999, President Burhanuddin Rabbani trekked to Moscow where in an act of genuflection to Russian President Vladimir Putin, traded away Afghanistan’s right to sue Russia for war reparations in exchange for arms with which to fight the Taliban. A verbatim copy of his groveling letter to the Russian President can be found on pages 150-151 of Afghanistan a Search for Truth, Bruce G. Richardson, 2009.
The crimes of former Deputy Defense Minister Abdul Rashid Dostum, another of the Northern Alliance luminaries, are legendary in scope. In 1997, according to a recent article in Dharb-i-Mu’men, Dostum is responsible for the massacre of 8,450 POWs at Balkh and Dasht-i-Laili in 1997. The prisoners were slaughtered under orders of Abdul Mailk, deputy to Dostum. Initially, the atrocity was treated as propaganda by the mainstream media and the United Nations Commission for Human Rights who have as yet to investigate the incident. In yet another atrocity, the bloody ethnic cleansing of Pashtuns by elements of the Northern Alliance and their foreign sponsors is also well-known and certifiably documented. (5, 9)
Isabelle Khan of UNCHR has called for war crimes tribunals to be established for Afghanistan. In predictable fashion, former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah Abdullah has stated that any war crimes should be limited to the Taliban regime. “We should forget the past and move to the future” he said. President Obama has promised Physicians for Human Rights that he “would collect evidence of this atrocity and make a decision based on the findings.” This promise was made two years ago. As yet, the president has not undertaken the initiative to convene an investigation of his erstwhile allies in the war on terror…the Northern Alliance. In addition to alleged war crimes many members of the Northern Alliance have sequestered billions of illegal dollars acquired from various foreign sponsors during their tenure, most of which is invested in the UAE. (6)
Russian, Indian and Iranian support of the Northern Alliance is well documented. Within which compilation, it is reputed that Dr. Abdullah Abdullah has strong ties to Russia and India while others in the National Coalition harbor similar sympathies. Thus the question becomes, if history be our guide, will the budding candidates from the Northern Alliance, newly resuscitated as the National Coalition of Afghanistan, represent and pursue Afghanistan’s Russia’s, India or Iran’s interests? (7, 8, 9)With the history of the Jihad period recorded for posterity, and serving as a political template…the answer, while troubling is obvious. Were the National Coalition for Afghanistan to assume power in Afghanistan it would undoubtedly guarantee a continuation of the seemingly endless and ongoing cycle of foreign cultivation, patronage and violence… as they would most assuredly be rejected by the Afghan people. See: Plamya Afgana by Deputy Soviet Advisor to Dr. Najibullah, General A.A. Liakhovskii, 1999, and 2004, pp.485-486, 630-674, Russian to English translation for the Cold War in History Project, Washington, D.C. (CWIHP) by Gary Goldberg.
Bruce G. Richardson, 1/2013
Notes:
(1) Afghanistan’s Troubling Political Landscape, ‘Asia Times’, B. Khan, 11/02/11, p.13A.
(2) Post- Taliban Afghanistan,’ Afghanistan, a Search for Truth’, Bruce G. Richardson, 2009, pp. 270-273.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Afghanistan’s Troubling Political Landscape, ’Asia Times’, B. Khan, 11/02/11, p.13A.
(5) Post-Taliban Afghanistan, ‘Afghanistan, a Search for Truth’, Bruce G. Richardson, 2009, pp. 270-273.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Interview: With Shahnawaz Tanai, Khalqi Defense Minister, 1988, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, November 12, 1997. Translation by Sayed Noorulhaq Husseini.
(8) Interview: With Ismael Khan, Sarpooza Prison, October 26, 1997.Translation by Sayed Noorulhaq Husseini. Ismael Khan signed a truce with Soviet generals to allow for safe passage for and withdrawal of Soviet troops.
(9) American Raj, Liberation or Domination, Resolving the Conflict between the West and the Muslim World, Eric S. Margolis, 2006, pp. 196, 199.

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Text of speech enunciated by Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan at research conference in France

The full text of speech enunciated by two representatives from Political Office of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Mawlawi Shahbuddin Dilawar and Doctor Muhammad Naeem, at research conference in Chantilly of France convened from 20-21/12/2012:

In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful – All praise is due to Allah, the Lord of the worlds, and may His peace and blessing be upon the noblest of prophets and messengers, his family and companions.

We foremost thank Foundation for Strategic Research as well as its Director, Camille Grand, for taking practical steps, on basis of humanitarian sympathy, towards peace and tranquility for the Afghan nation and especially for affording an opportunity to the Islamic Emirate to express its viewpoint. We also thank all other parties that have strived for this cause.

Balance of political power in the future government of Afghanistan

In the future Islamic government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the balance of power or participation in government of by all Afghan parties must be implemented in the constitution upon below specifications:

1 – Codification of Constitution

Every power and system of government in the current world needs a complete and clear constitution to organize and coordinate its internal and foreign affairs in order to pave the way for advancement and prosperity of its citizens and so that every person properly grasps their role in the confines of law. Constitution is integral for every government because, without it, the affairs of development of its nation and country will face disorder and numerous obstacles. The personal, civil and political rights of all citizens of Afghanistan shall be regulated through the Constitution; rights shall be given to all brother ethnicities without discrimination; will make clear relations between the government and people; will shed light on balance of government three structured powers; will determine government’s type, administration and powers; in sum, will gain acceptance from the Afghan nation and the world regarding the internal and foreign policy of Afghanistan.

Therefore the Islamic Emirate, for the welfare, prosperity and advancement of its proud nation, considers such a constitution necessary which is framed on the principles of nobel Islam, national interests, historical achievements and social justice; abides by Human Rights and national values; guarantees the country’s sovereignty and rights of all its citizens and shall not contain any articles and clauses opposing Islamic principles, national interests and Afghan mores. With the blessing of constitution, way shall be paved for political power balance and all Afghan parties to participate in the upcoming government.

We clearly state the stipulations of the constitution shall be written by Afghan scholars in a free atmosphere and will then be presented to the nation for approval. The current constitution of Afghanistan is illegitimate because it is written under the shadows of B-52 aircrafts.

2 – 2014 elections

We believe that the 2014 elections are not beneficial for solving the Afghan quandary because these elections are planned under invasion and will take place during ongoing occupation therefore the results shall be no different than the previous elections. All observed that the 2004 and 2009 elections did not lessen but increased problems for the Afghans. So called National Assembly elections were also held twice however it failed to solve the nation’s problems but contrarily, increased them many folds. All this because elections laws, organizations and officials involved were created at the fancy and requests of foreigners while the demands and needs of the Afghans were not attended. The said elections did not only not solve the Afghan quandary but also brought shame to the western backers of the stooge regime; fraud was rampant, ballots went missing, vow ceremony faced dilemmas and holdups and the opening ceremony of national assembly faced several months delay.

3 – Islamic Emirate

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is an Islamic reality on the face of the planet, is the legitimate government of our beloved country, has every operational administration and has notable achievements in several areas. People in the majority parts of the country turn towards its courts, political activities in shape of a Political Office is known to everyone an example of which is our presence here and education is also forging ahead in many parts of the country with the Emirate’s help. America with the help of over forty (40) countries have invaded our country. The Islamic Emirate has carried out sacred Jihad against the occupation for over eleven years and has put forward notable sacrifices for the independence of its country and defense of its religion and honor. The Islamic Emirate had brought security to over 95% of the country before the invasion; had collected illegal weapons; had stopped narcotics; had secured borders of the beloved country; had provided education, work and open trade for the nation in complete security. We can even proudly state that in the previous reign of Islamic Emirate, we achieved things which the western world is unable to do even with its entire military and economic means.

It has repeatedly been expounded in the messages of Amir ul Mumineen that we are not looking to monopolize power. We want an all Afghan inclusive government. He has time and again urged his opposition for help in expelling the occupation. That he respects his political rivals, expounds on realization and understanding and asks for help from them in defense of our nation and honor, this clearly displays his goodwill and political insight.

4 – Sovereignty of Afghanistan

Allah Almighty has created humans free and independence is a part of their nature. No human society can make advancements in economics, politics, culture and science without independence or have control over its resources, talents and fruits of their work. Love with independence is naturally sown in the blood and body of the Afghans. History has shown that the Afghans have sacrificed their lives and everything dear for independence. All battles fought in the past decades against invasions have been for independence. No economic, military or political power has scared them in attaining their goal and neither has the lack of means, men and hard conditions been a hurdle.

If we want to once again pave the way for the country’s natural development and dignity then the independence of Afghanistan must be restored and occupation ended so that the Afghans can make decisions in the best interests of its power and people for the benefit of its nation.

It is also a reality that every nation, after attaining independence, has a need to maintain its borders, security and sovereignty and this need can only be accomplished through police and army faithful to its people, religion and nation. Therefore it is incumbent that our security apparatus be trained on religious principles and national spirit; is cleansed from prejudice on lingual, ethnical and regional basis and is bound to serving its people and securing its sovereignty. If it is not as such then such an army in not fit for maintaining its national and Islamic goals and neither can it be called a national army. Instead of working for national interests, it will be used against its religion, country and people. Hence, as much as Afghanistan needs an army, its reforming and proper training is also that much vital.

Afghanistan is an underdeveloped nation economically. It cannot maintain a highly paid army in the long term due to its expenses being several times higher than the country’s GDP. In such a condition, the government will be forced to abide by terms and sometimes unreasonable demands of lending nations, bringing the whole nation under the burden of interest and pushing them towards economic disaster. Due to this, it will be better for all Afghans to fulfill their obligation in securing the country.

It is also a reality that in the current world, a country cannot feel secure and at peace without a powerful defensive system and will have to always feel at danger. Hence it is necessary that Afghanistan builds a strong air force alongside a strong ground force in order to reassure its nation.

We must reiterate that independence is the key condition because in presence of an occupation, all this force will be used against its own people and for the goals of others. We observed in the past decade that an army built on political foundations gets used and is used against its people instead of the invasion and becomes the reason for many tragedies.

3. How can enduring peace be achieved in Afghanistan

The Islamic Emirate came into to being to bring peace to its people:

Peace and tranquility is the natural want of all creatures of Allah Alimighty and especially for humans, who are in need of peace more than any other being. Today humans have made much progress; for killing and destruction, it has created small, chemical and nuclear weapons therefore it is in need of peace more than ever and efforts must be made for peace.

Islamic Emirate, for peace and order, has given great sacrifices for this mutual goal whereas it actually came into being to bring peace and security. The entire world in aware that the oppressed Afghan nation faced great difficulties before the Islamic Emirate came into being; corruption and insecurity had reached its peak; the life and property of the people were in constant danger and the country was standing on the brink of disintegration. The leaders of Islamic Emirate, with the divine help of Allah Almighty and backing of its nation, and result of many sacrifices brought end to all this anarchy such that no one could have ever imagined and transformed an atmosphere of insecurity and disorder to that of security and peace.

Taking away security from the Afghan nation under guise of September incident:

The Islamic Emirate had brought security to 95% of the country and this displays the responsibility of Islamic Emirate which it had and still has regarding the world, region and specifically its own country and nation. However with great regret, the invaders deprived the Afghan nation from this great blessing. They brought insecurity for the Afghan people in this eleven year war and fighting, brought culture of injustice and corruption, stirred up market of killings and murders, over flooded pools with blood, stuffed prisons with the Afghan people, began oppression of children, women, old men and youngsters in villages and homes, created difficulties for the lives of women which is their most basic and important right and planted seeds of enmity between Afghanistan and its neighboring countries.

Some primary problems created by this illegal and peace-shattering invasion

1. Occupying Afghanistan and disturbing atmosphere of peace.

2. Forcing an administration on Afghans embroiled in corruption and narcotics trade.

3. Working to divide the Afghan nation and country on basis of regional, lingual, tribal, political and religious animosities.

4. Nurturing narcotics while the Islamic Emirate had brought it to a complete end.

5. Violating human rights, the most important issue of which is the life and destiny of women. According to well established researches, thousands of women are targets of repression every year, hundreds of whom have even died.

Invaders and their allies don’t have a clear framework for peace:

Foreigners and Kabul do not have an inclination towards peace and neither are they ready to abide by the rules and goals of peace. If the invaders truly believe in peace, they would have listened to the legitimate demands of Islamic Emirate in the initial phase. They should have tested peace before force; if it had failed to give results then war was a last resort however they chose war as the first option.

Even now, they state one thing and do another. On the one hand they say that peace must be achieved an on the other, they add new people to the black list; they say that they will leave Afghanistan but sign strategic pacts in false hopes of prolonging their occupation. They are doing this despite being well informed that the Kabul administration can never represent the Afghan people but still bargain with them on the future of the Afghan nation.

The Kabul administration does not hold any jurisdiction or power because the Afghan people, in their own land and through the medium of Kabul, are being imprisoned by the invaders! With their presence and their help, the homes of Afghans are being recklessly raided by the invaders at night against all laws and customs; children, women and old men peacefully asleep are being mercilessly killed and they are still unable to take any steps against them.

The Kabul administration is does not seem inclined towards peace due to some steps and because it does not have a clear framework for peace. On the one hand it says that it wantd peace and on the other, martyrs tens of Mujahideen everyday or imprisons them or forces them to migrate. It shouts for peace but then unjustly and brutally executes imprisoned Mujahideen against all international laws!

Sometimes it says it wants to talk with the Islamic Emirate, sometimes it says it wants to talk to Pakistan! Such ambiguous actions will never positively impact the peace process.

In reality, they want surrender of Mujahideen under the title of peace; give up arms, abide by the constitution created under the shadow of invaders and bow your heads to our orders and we won’t say anything to you! Is this peace? Do they think that the Afghan nation gave colossal sacrifices for the past eleven years to surrender to the invaders? So that someone will assure their lives? This clearly shows that they do not have sincerity and a clear framework for peace.

Malicious propaganda against peace:

Another factor damaging peace are those efforts made through poisonous propaganda deployed inside the country which tries to depict reality in another color. Different types of propaganda is used against the ongoing Jihad; sometimes it is labeled the work of neighbors, sometimes as against education and development and sometimes is accused of causing civilian casualties but never seem to possess strong evidence and only reiterates repeated charges. Such black propaganda only prolongs the war and uproots chances for peace.

Everyone is aware that members of Islamic Emirate, for their independent Islamic and national policy, have not only tasted torture and martyrdom inside their internal prisons but have also been victims of such behavior in prisons outside the country. So can men of such determination and ideology ever become slaves of others?

The esteemed Amir ul Mumineen (may Allah protect him) has given strong and clear guidelines to his Mujahideen, who are still practicing them, in all his Eid messages regarding destruction of educational facilities, protection of civilian life and bombings in places of gatherings which have also been published in the media. However we can see that some intelligence agencies are reaching for grotesque actions (blowing up bridges, throwing acid on faces of students and targeting civilian vehicles with roadside bombings) while the Kabul administration has never given thought to the guidance of Amir ul Mumineen and is blindly using these incidents as raw material for its poisonous propaganda. Similarly, they never release findings of such incidents which show that these have not been perpetrated by the Mujahideen and are works of intelligence agencies. They are either void of courage to announce the reality or believe keeping silent is in their best interest.

They believe that with such actions, they will sideline the Islamic Emirate from people and the world and extend its power a few more days. Peace is being sacrificed in the long run with such unreasonable actions and poisonous propaganda. If this keeps continuing, it will only harm peace, country and the people.

The Kabul administration and its backers must realize that such tactics did not bring security to the people but threw them into raging fire, violated their rights and prolonged the invasion and will still fail to bring peace.

How can real peace be achieved?

The situation in Afghanistan is two faceted, one of which is foreign and the other internal. The foreign facet is tied to the foreigners and the internal to the Afghans. How can they reach an understanding so that, in accordance with the aspirations of the nation, such an independent Islamic government can come into being which will guarantee justice, stability, development, economic growth and prosperity; wipes the tears of widows and treats the wounds of the people.

The Islamic Emirate, alongside all its efforts inside the country, is struggling for a true Islamic system and enduring peace and considers it vital for human life and regards the following few points important:

1. For enduring peace, importance must be placed on the aspirations of the people. The occupation must be ended as a first step which is the want of the entire nation because this is the mother of all these tragedies. Invaders and their allies must realize that no international power can subdue the power of people and neither can the quandary end with irresponsible and unlawful agreements.

2. Islam is the religion of our people and the only guarantor of the country’s economic growth, social justice and national unity. Without an independent Islamic government, no other system can solve our problems because the Muslim Afghan nation will not accept any other system contradicting a pure independent Islamic government and they have presented countless sacrifices for this goal for the past thirty years and are still sacrificing.

3. Peace needs sincerity and good intention. Common and national interests must be favored over personal interests. Peace can only be achieved under these circumstances and not through deceit and stratagems. We are seeing that every time the Islamic Emirate takes steps towards peace, Kabul administration takes reactive tactical steps which (according to their own belief) has the potential to derail the peace process while at the same time not seem counterproductive i.e when the Islamic Emirate inaugurated its political office in Doha for peace talks, the Kabul administration, with the backing and America, recalled its ambassador to damage the peace process.

4. The leader of Islamic Emirate, the esteemed Amir ul Muminee (may Allah protect him), clearly stated in his Eid message that we only have one channel for political efforts in form of an office and have made it known to everyone. But still the Kabul administration, under the title of peace process for sabotaging peace, makes contacts with people that have not been appointed by Islamic Emirate for peace talks and then accuses the Islamic Emirate of trying to derail peace. Peace is not a game of chess where every side is laying in ambush for the other rather peace is a joint responsibility and a mean of giving right to the entitled. Peace must be looked at with this vision and ways must be paved for it.

5. The Islamic Emirate welcomes all civil societies that work for the benefit of the Afghan nation and abides by Afghan norms and humanity in the light of Islamic principles.

6. The policy of Islamic Emirate is clear regarding role of women. It will abide by all those rights given to women in the noble religion of Islam. Women in Islam have the right to choose husbands, own property, right to inheritance and right to education and work. The Islamic Emirate will safeguard the rights of women such that their legitimate rights are not violated and neither is their human dignity and Islamic requirements endangered under the guise of education and work.

7. In accordance with rules and regulations of peace, such bodies should be utilized that believe in the sanctity of peace and are famously known in the country as righteous peace brokers. They must consider establishment of peace as vital for the Afghans and must not look at it through the lens of a request made by the foreigners.

8. For peace, talks must practically be given preference over war. At this very moment, Kabul administration and its foreign allies are trying to put pressure on Mujahideen so that they make peace according to their conditions and this truly increases hurdles for peace.

9. As long as Mujahideen are imprisoned where they spend nights in torture and persecution, true peace is cannot be achieved.

10. The Islamic Emirate wants to interact with the world and region on basis of mutual respect and two-way cooperation. It did not harm anyone before neither will it today or in the future and neither will it let others use the Afghan soil against others.

To end, a few appeals to the international community regarding establishment of peace:

1. The whole impartial international community, be they countries or nations, associations or societies, especially the International Ulama Council, the Islamic Conference, Islamic governments and people, must lend all faceted help to the Afghans in putting an end to the occupation in order to remove this hurdle and pave the way for inter-Afghan understanding.

We specifically ask the member states of United Nations to stand next to the oppressed Afghan people as they stood with the Palestinian people. Just as you did not care about force and pressure from others, adopt a similar and based-on-realities policy for the Afghan nation so that on the one hand, help is rendered to a persecuted nation and on the other, the tyrants realize that their oppression and cruelty will no longer be tolerated and they end their wrong doings.

2. America and those who have allied with them under different names must answer the calls of the Afghan and their own nations, withdraw all their troops and put an end to the killing and oppression of the helpless Afghans. Instead help them with such that creates an atmosphere of peace between them.

The step taken by France in this regard is worth respecting. All the others should follow the footsteps of France and listen to the wants and interests of their people. Just as you do not desire killings, disorder, injustice, corruption and treachery for your own nations, do not desire it for others either.

3. We especially call on all those nations, whose governments have sent their sons against their approval to kill the innocent Afghan people, to take a page from the French nation and put pressure on their governments to withdraw its troops from our country.

4. The Islamic Emirate should be granted freedom of speech. It should be helped in reaching its voice to the world so they are able to themselves directly communicate their policy and demands. We also ask the international community to furnish all members of Islamic Emirate with facilities and exert efforts in removing all obstacles.

We thank the government of Japan and officials of Doshisha University for giving the Islamic Emirate an opportunity to communicate its views and policies to the world and now thank the officials of Foundation for Strategic Research and all other related sides in helping the Islamic Emirate in this regard. Other nations, in order to realize the realities, must also take similar steps.

5. We hope the international media will help properly reach the voice of the Afghan nation to the region and the world and accurately show the ground realities to the people because this is their humanitarian responsibility and from the ethics of journalism.

And this is never hard for Allah Almigthy

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MAZAR-I-SHARIF, Afghanistan — The atrocities of the Afghan civil war in the 1990s are still recounted in whispers here — tales of horror born out of a scorched-earth ethnic and factional conflict in which civilians and captured combatants were frequently slaughtered en masse.

Stark evidence of such killings are held in the mass graves that still litter the Afghan countryside. One such site is outside Mazar-i-Sharif, in the north. It lies only half-excavated, with bones and the remains of clothing partially obscured by water and mud from recent flooding. Experts say at least 16 victims are here, and each skull that lies exposed is uniformly punctured by a single bullet-entry hole at the back.

The powerful men accused of responsibility for these deaths and tens of thousands of others — some said to be directly at their orders, others carried out by men in their chain of command — are named in the pages of a monumental 800-page report on human rights abuses in Afghanistan from 1978, before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to the fall of the Taliban in 2001, according to researchers and officials who helped compile the study over the past six years.

The list of names is a sort of who’s who of power players in Afghanistan: former and current warlords or officials, some now in very prominent positions in the national government, as well as in insurgent factions fighting it. Many of the named men were principals in the civil war era after the Soviet Union withdrew, and they are also frequently mentioned when talk here turns to fears of violence after the end of the NATO combat mission in 2014. Already, there is growing concern about a scramble for power and resources along ethnic and tribal lines.

But the report seeking to hold them accountable is unlikely to be released anytime soon, the researchers say, accusing senior Afghan officials of effectively suppressing the work and those responsible for it. For their part, human rights activists say the country is doomed to repeat its violent past if abuses are not brought to light and prosecuted.

At the same time, some officials here — including some American diplomats — express worry that releasing the report will actually trigger new civil strife.

Titled simply, “Conflict Mapping in Afghanistan Since 1978,” the study, prepared by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, details the locations and details of 180 mass graves of civilians or prisoners, many of the sites secret and none of them yet excavated properly. It compiles testimony from survivors and witnesses to the mass interments, and details other war crimes as well.

The study was commissioned as part of a reconciliation and justice effort ordered by President Hamid Karzai in 2005, and it was completed this past December. Some of the world’s top experts in forensics and what is called transitional justice advised the commission on the report and provided training and advice for the 40 researchers who worked on it over a six-year period.

Three Afghan and foreign human rights activists who worked as researchers and analysts on large sections of the report spoke about its contents on condition of anonymity, both out of fear of reprisal and because the commission had not authorized them to discuss it publicly.

According to Afghan rights advocates and Western officials, word that the report was near to being officially submitted to the president apparently prompted powerful former warlords, including the first vice president, Marshal Muhammad Qasim Fahim, to demand that Mr. Karzai dismiss the commissioner responsible, Ahmad Nader Nadery.

At a meeting on Dec. 21, including Mr. Karzai and other top officials, Marshal Fahim argued that dismissing Mr. Nadery would actually be too mild a punishment. “We should just shoot 30 holes in his face,” he said, according to one of those present. He later apologized to other officials for the remark, saying it was not meant in earnest.

Mr. Karzai did remove Mr. Nadery. But a spokesman for the president, Aimal Faizi, said it was “irresponsible and untrue” to say that the president fired Mr. Nadery because of the mass graves report or was trying to block its release. He also called the accounts of the Dec. 21 meeting with Marshal Fahim and other officials “totally baseless.”

Mr. Nadery had finished two five-year terms as a commissioner and the president was legally entitled to replace him, Mr. Faizi said. “This decision has nothing to do with any A.I.H.R.C. report on war atrocities,” he said. “We believe that if there is any such report by the A.I.H.R.C., sooner or later it will come up and will be published one day.”

The figures accused in the report of playing some role in mass killings include some of the most powerful figures in Afghanistan’s government and ethnic factions, including the Northern Alliance that fought the Taliban in 2001.

Among them are First Vice President Fahim, a Tajik from the Jamiat Islami Party, and Second Vice President Karim Khalili, a Hazara leader from the Wahdat Party; Gen. Atta Mohammed Noor, a Tajik from the Jamiat Islami Party and now the governor of the important northern province of Balkh, of which Mazar-i-Sharif is capital; and Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, a former Uzbek warlord from the Jumbush Party who holds the honorary title of chief of staff to the supreme commander of the Afghan Armed Forces, among many others.

Those men gave no response to verbal and written requests for comment about their naming in the report.

In all, the researchers said, more than 500 Afghans are named in the report as responsible for mass killings, including the country’s revered national martyr, Ahmed Shah Massoud, one of the last militia leaders to hold out against the Taliban sweep to power and who was assassinated by Al Qaeda just before the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

The report also investigates killings of civilians and prisoners said to be carried out by the Taliban and other insurgents, including Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of the Hezb-i-Islami insurgents.

Named specifically in the report as responsible for war crimes in massacres of prisoners in northern Afghanistan are two Taliban commanders now held at the Guantánamo Bay prison camp — Mullah Fazul Akhund and Mullah Khairullah Khirkawa — and whose release is thought to be a condition of negotiations with the insurgent group.

Entombed Evidence

As the report languishes, evidence in the graves is being destroyed, sometimes as a function of poor care of the sites and sometimes intentionally.

One mass grave containing more than 100 dead was discovered in the Kefayet Square area of Mazar-i-Sharif, where General Noor holds sway, during a road-building project in March. The half-dozen bodies that were turned up were simply relocated to a cemetery and the construction went on, bulldozing over most of the rest of the remains.

In 2007, two mass graves in the Khalid Ibn al-Walid township of Mazar were simply covered over by construction of a new residential complex that researchers said was developed and owned by General Noor.

A researcher for the Afghan rights commission who investigated both of the graves in Khalid Ibn al-Walid said the victims were killed by General Noor’s political party, which had what the researcher called a “human slaughterhouse” on the site in the 1990s, as well as by the Taliban, who later took over the same facility for the same purpose.

In the case of the grave with exposed skulls, it was discovered in January by American and Afghan workers during a United States Army Corps of Engineers construction project in Dehdadi District, six miles outside Mazar-i-Sharif — one of at least two graves found there so far. Human rights investigators said that grave dated from the period when General Dostum and his Hazara allies controlled the site; the victims, their wrists still bound in many cases with stout twine, included women and children, judging from the clothing found with them.

During the civil war period, after the Communists were defeated and before the Taliban took power, warlords like General Noor, General Dostum, and the Hazara leader Hajji Mohammad Mohaqiq fought bitterly among themselves as well as against the Taliban, who are mostly ethnic Pashtuns. The conflict among these leaders, who had all fought in the jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, was on both political and ethnic grounds.

For many Afghans, the warlords’ atrocities are taken as a given — old news better left unrevived.

“It will take us centuries to forget this,” said an Afghan National Army lieutenant colonel. “We don’t want to go back to those bad days again.”

In all, 13 mass graves have been identified in the Mazar-i-Sharif area, including one detailed by human rights workers in the Dasht-e-Leili desert in the neighboring Jawjzan Province, believed to contain 2,000 Taliban prisoners slaughtered by General Dostum’s forces.

“That grave was there and then suddenly it was not there,” said a second human rights worker who worked on the investigation in Jawjzan. “They just got rid of all the evidence.”

He said bulldozers were brought in during 2008 to remove the bodies, leaving huge pits behind. The remains were reportedly incinerated at a secret location, he said.

A Question of Will

Mr. Nadery would not discuss the contents of the mapping report except in the most general way. “You open the map in the report, you see there are dots everywhere,” he said. “Everyone should know that what they suffered was not unique. We should be able to tell our people: ‘This is our past, this is our history. It’s ugly, it’s bad, but we should be able to face it.’ ”

He said he still hoped that the commission would be able to submit the report, although he conceded that those prospects looked dim.

“I don’t want the report to become an event, just a headline for one day,” he said. Instead, he said, it needs to be presented officially so it can be acted on officially, whether by the Afghan government or by the international community.

He said the report tallied more than a million people killed in the conflict and 1.3 million disabled, although not all of those are necessarily victims of war crimes.

Other human-rights officials in Afghanistan also expressed urgency about releasing the report.

“There are lots of examples where a report like this was an important first step to bringing justice for the victims,” said Heather Barr, head of the Human Rights Watch office in Afghanistan. “It does put pressure on people who are named; it leads at least to marginalizing them.”

The volatility of the accusations was on full display in April, when a well-established but small political bloc, the Afghanistan Solidarity Party, held a demonstration against what it said were war criminals in government. “For us there is no difference between the Taliban and these war criminals,” said Hafizullah Rasikh, a party spokesman. “They are like twin brothers.”

Parliament responded with a declaration accusing the party of treason and demanding its disbandment.

A former mujahedeen commander, Abdul Hafiz Mansoor, who is now an editor of a weekly publication called Mujahed, did not deny that many atrocities took place, on all sides.

“One cannot make war with rosewater,” he said, referring to a popular ingredient in sweets and perfumes here. “If this war and all these killings were so bad, then why aren’t we putting their international backers on trial? If we talk about violation of human rights, we should accuse the U.N. special representative for Afghanistan, who supported the mujahedeen at the time and now calls them warlords. Or President Ronald Reagan, who provided these warlords and human rights violators with Stinger missiles.”

The American Embassy here has been another source of objection to the mass-graves report. American officials say releasing the report would be a bad idea, at least until after Afghanistan’s 2014 presidential election — which is also when the NATO combat withdrawal should be complete. “I have to tell you frankly on the mapping thing, when I first learned about it, it scared me,” said a senior American official, speaking on condition of anonymity as a matter of embassy policy. “There will be a time for it, but I’m not persuaded this is the time.”

“It’s going to reopen all the old wounds,” the official said, noting that several men who were bitter rivals during the civil war were at least nominally working together in the government now.

For its part, the United Nations has supported release of the report. “The U.N. position has always been that such reports should always be released publicly,” said Georgette Gagnon, the top human rights officer for the United Nations mission in Afghanistan. “But it’s up to the commission and we would support whatever they decide to do.”

Of the 180 graves documented in the report, only one has so far been exhumed forensically because the Afghan authorities lack the facilities to carry out DNA testing and the sort of scientific identification of remains that was done systematically in Bosnia.

That one was a grave on the grounds of the Interior Ministry in Kabul, according to M. Ashraf Bakhteyari, head of the Forensic Science Organization, a foreign-trained group that carried out the exhumation. Mr. Bakhteyari said he was ordered by the Interior Ministry not to divulge who the victims were. “It is classified information,” he said.

He is frank, though, about the prospects for investigating the rest of Afghanistan’s mass graves. “It is impossible to prosecute those who are responsible for the mass graves,” Mr. Bakhteyari said. “Neither the international community nor the Afghan government have the will to do that.”

Source: NYT

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